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ABSTRACT
HAMIDZADE, SAGHAR Is Turkey turning away from the West?
Department of Political Science, June 2011.

ADVISOR: Tom Lobe
The purpose of this thesis is to answer the question of whether Turkey is turning away
from its traditional western allies and reorienting itself towards the Middle East. The first chapter
examines Turkey’s past, particularly the legacy of the Ottoman era, the Kemalist period, and the
Cold War era, in order to its historical foundations. The second chapter analyzes the changes on
the Turkish domestic scene from 1950 up to today. The focus of this chapter is on the Kemalists’
repression of democracy and the social and political shift among much of the population in
reaction to their suppressive ways. The third chapter assesses Turkey’s political and economic
relations with the West, in particular its ties with the United States, the European Union, and
Israel in order to understand how and why they have changed in recent years. Finally, the fourth
chapter examines Turkey’s political and economic relations with the East, specifically Iraq, Iran,
Syria, and the broader Arab world. The aim of this chapter is to understand the underlying
reasons driving Turkey’s growing engagement with the Middle East and whether it contradicts
its relations with the West.
After this through examination of Turkey’s historical trajectory, its domestic situation,
and its current political and economic relations with the East and the West, I have concluded that
Turkey is not turning away from the West. Turkey’s relations with the Middle East have indeed
improved and Turkey--for the first time it in its modern history-- is becoming a major player in
the region. Furthermore, its active role in the East is not replacing, but complementing, its
relations with the West.
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Introduction
Turkey used to be known for its one-dimensional and strictly westward oriented
foreign policy particularly during the Cold War. It mainly focused on its relations with
the United States and the European Union, and completely detached itself from the
countries that were once part of its Ottoman past. The Middle East especially was never a
foreign policy priority for much of the Republic’s history. In fact, Turkey associated
much of the Muslim world with backwardness and had little interest in establishing ties
with Middle Eastern nations. The official ideology of the state, Kemalism, espoused by
the founder of the Turkish Republic, Kemal Ataturk, turned its back on the Islamic world
and pursued an exclusively Western path. The Cold War environment, and the Soviet
threat further pushed Turkey into the Western camp, as it joined NATO and aligned itself
with Washington. For the next several decades, Turkey became known for its
unconditional support for U.S. foreign policy and its one-sided orientation.
Today, Turkey’s foreign policy stands completely transformed. After decades of
benign neglect toward the Middle East, Turkey is now emerging as an active player in the
region. Turkey is launching ambitious initiatives in the region and carving out a greater
role for itself in Middle Eastern affairs. Over the past few years Turkey has established
close ties with Iran, Syria, Iraq, assumed a leadership position in the Organization of
Islamic Conference, which is the world’s largest Muslim organization, and strengthened

1

its political, diplomatic and economic ties with most Arab and Muslim states. 1 This
departure from its traditional foreign policy has been the source of much debate within
the international community, particularly in the United States.
“How the West lost Turkey,” “Turkey turns to the East,” “Turkey’s Shifting
Foreign Policy,” are some of the few headlines in the U.S., referring to Turkey’s new
foreign policy initiatives. Western claims that Turkey is “drifting away” and being “lost”
perhaps began with Turkey’s refusal to allow Washington to use its bases in the War
against Iraq. Since 2003, such claims have proliferated, especially with Turkey’s vote
against tougher sanctions on Iran, and its deteriorating relations with Israel. In an article
published in The New York Times, Thomas Friedman, a well-known columnist, stated
that “Turkey [is] seemingly focused not on joining the European Union but the Arab
League — no, scratch that, on joining the Hamas-Hezbollah-Iran resistance front against
Israel.” 2 Other neo-conservative journalists have made similar allegations. Michael
Rubin for example states: “Turks saw themselves in a camp with the United States,
Western Europe, and Israel; today Turkish self-identity places the country firmly in a
camp led by Iran, Syria, Sudan, and Hamas.” 3 Neo-conservatives are especially skeptical
of Turkey’s new engagement in the Middle East. Michael Rubin, for example claims that
“Turks saw themselves in a camp with the United States, Western Europe, and Israel;
1
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Middle East Center, 2008), 2.
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today Turkish self-identity places the country firmly in a camp led by Iran, Syria, Sudan,
and Hamas.” 4 Rubin and other neo-conservatives tend to imply that under the “Islamist”
government of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Turkey now poses a grave threat
to the West. 5 Such analyses about Turkey becoming a dangerous nation and pursuing an
Islamist agenda misconstrue Erdoğan and the Justice and Development Party’s (AKP)
main objectives and are a complete misrepresentation of Turkey’s foreign policy.
The AKP government’s new foreign policy has not turned Turkey into a
threatening nation; rather it has transformed Turkey into an active regional power and has
boosted its strategic importance. Turkey has always played a special role in the
international system because of its unique cultural and geographical position at the
crossroads of Europe and Asia. However, throughout much of its history, it failed to take
full advantage of its unique geographical position as it largely ignored its eastern
neighbors. Now however, Turkey is utilizing this positive characteristic and expanding its
relations in the broader Middle East while maintaining its ties with the EU and the United
States. Turkey’s recent economic growth and stability has further increased its strategic
importance in the international community. In addition to being a member of NATO and
an EU candidate, Turkey is now an active member of the G20, it was given a temporary
seat on the UN Security Council in 2009 and as already mentioned it is playing a key role
in Organization of the Islamic Conference. Currently a Turk serves as the secretary4
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general of the OIC. 6 Turkey’s foreign policy is ultimately driven by Ankara’s desire to
expand its global partnership and enhance its strategic clout. AKP leaders believe the best
way to achieve this goal is for Turkey to take advantage of its rich Ottoman legacy and
rebuild ties round the former empire.
The question of Turkey’s East vs. West orientation is a fascinating one and has
important implications for the region. A prosperous, democratic, and stable Turkey,
which has good relations with both the East and the West, can take on the role of regional
model, mediator and leader. Turkey has the capacity to affect regional and international
stability in a number of different areas, including the Middle East, the Balkans, the
Caucasus, and Europe. Furthermore, at time of increasing polarization between the West
and the Islamic world, Turkey as a modern Muslim nation and a regional superpower, is
the only country that has the ability to bridge the gap between East and West.

6

"A Special Report on Turkey: Anchors aweigh," The Economist, October 23, 2010.
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CHAPTER 1: Key Historical Eras
The Ottoman Era
The Ottoman Empire was one of the most influential and powerful empires in
history, known for its incredible expansion and cultural diversity. At the height of its
power, the Ottoman Empire stretched over three different continents, including Africa,
Europe, and Asia, from the Indian Ocean to the gates of Vienna. It encompassed a wide
range of ethnicities and religious groups and was a multicultural empire. The Ottomans
were not particularly liberal minded, but were very tolerant of the various religious and
ethnic groups that resided within the empire. They welcomed the Jews who were fleeing
from the Spanish Inquisition and protected Protestants and Orthodox Christians from
Catholic persecution. 7 Although the Ottoman Empire was home to many different
religious groups, Sunni Islam was the state religion and the sultans were committed to its
protection and expansion.
As the Ottoman Empire conquered Arab lands, Islam gained significant
importance. In the early 1500s the Ottoman Empire expanded southward into Arab lands,
conquering Mecca and Medina, the two holy cities of Islam, and also Jerusalem. With
this expansion it also acquired a great number of new Muslim subjects in the Middle East
and North Africa. This conquest “transformed the Ottoman Empire into a world power
straddling the ancient routes between the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean” and
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Howard A. Douglas, The History of Turkey (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 2001), 6.
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gradually shifted the Empire’s identity towards the Islamic world. 8 By the end of 1533,
the Ottomans not only conquered the holy cities of Islam but they had also laid claim to
Damascus, the capital of the Umayyad Caliphs, and Baghdad, the capital of the Abbasid
Caliphs. Nearly all of the Arab Middle East was under Ottoman rule and would remain so
for nearly 400 years. 9 The conquest of the Arab world solidified the Ottoman Empire’s
Islamic legitimacy and identity. The sultans now considered themselves both the rulers of
the Ottoman Empire as well as the caliphs and guardians of Islam.
Once the Arab states were under Ottoman rule, the empire’s Islamic credentials
increased significantly, and the Sultans, particularly Sultan Süleyman, now considered it
their responsibility to promote Islamic ways. The Ottoman Empire reached the peak of its
power due to the reign of Sultan Süleyman (1520-1566), who further expanded the
empire and captured the Christian strongholds of Belgrade in 1521 and Vienna in 1529. 10
During his rule, Süleyman established the administrative and legal system of the Empire
and fully incorporated Islam in every aspect of the state and society. Süleyman later
became known as the “true architect of the Ottoman religious establishment.” He
established sharia as the overriding law of the Empire and synthesized it along with
earlier Ottoman legal law. The fact that Süleyman initiated religious changes during the
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Ottoman Empire’s “golden age” was highly significant in legitimizing the religious
institutions. 11
Under Süleyman’s rule, Islamic law became integrated in the political, military,
and social institutions of the Ottoman Empire. Knowledge of Islamic theology became a
requirement for acquiring legal and administrative positions. Religious scholars were
appointed to the head of the Islamic authority by the sultan. These religious scholars
further incorporated sharia into the legal system and named the judges who were in
charge of enforcing the law. The Islamic school system trained religious scholars, judges,
and government bureaucrats, and also educated Muslim Turks, teaching them prayers and
verses from the Quran. 12 Because Islam was deeply implemented at both the local and
governmental level, it played a unifying role, linking the people to the state. 13 The staterun institutions and Islamic law during this period played a great role in creating an
Islamic identity and maintaining stability through its highly centralized character.
The Ottoman Empire’s complete focus on traditional and Islamic institutions,
however, caused it to remain intellectually behind the rising European powers. The
empire’s education curriculum was solely based on Quranic teachings and sharia law;
modern science and technology were rarely incorporated into its educational
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institutions. 14 With the rise of European powers, the weakness of the traditional Ottoman
institutions became highly evident. Compared to the Europeans who were advancing
socially, militarily, and economically, the Ottomans were lagging behind. By the
seventeenth century the Ottoman Empire was socially and economically stagnant because
no sector of the economy was allowed to flourish and disturb the balance and structure of
this centralized institution. 15 Once faced with an aggressive and industrial Europe, it
became evident that the old Ottoman institutions no longer met the needs of the empire in
the modern world, and the Ottomans came to the realization that the West’s superiority
was due to their developments in science and technology. 16
Once the Europeans armies began to defeat the Ottomans, statesmen were sent to
the West to study the reasons for Europe’s military superiority. When they discovered
that it was Europe’s use of modern science and technology that was contributing to their
success, they decided to bring the new technology to the Ottoman Empire by establishing
institutions that were similar to that of Europe’s. Those familiar with Western institutions
created engineering, military, and civil services schools with a secular Western curricula.
The Tanzimat, the Ottoman Empire’s first serious reform period, began shortly thereafter.
17
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The aim of the reform period was to modernize the Ottoman Empire so that it
could remain a powerful entity and level with the European powers. The realization and
need for modernity gave rise to this period of reformation, known as the Tanzimat period,
which lasted from 1839 to 1876. 18 Throughout this period the Ottomans reorganized their
administrative, political and economic institutions according to European models.
European experts and advisors were brought it to help carry out these reforms. 19 During
this period a new military medical school, a military school, and a faculty of
administrative sciences were also established. It is important to mention that the purpose
of these new institutions was to only adopt Western technology. The reformists did not
want to become westernized in culture, but rather felt that by emulating the West, they
could secure their territorial integrity and remain a superpower. 20 Although the Ottomans
did not intend on only emulating Western values, Western ideas and practices also spread
with the adoption of European technologies and secular institutions.
In the army military schools from example, “studying modern medicine, biology,
and physics almost inevitably induced a rationalist and positivist mentality in the
students, and the army medical schools spawned an extraordinary number of reformist
thinkers…” 21 Furthermore, many of the textbooks that were used for learning military
engineering were in fact written in European languages, especially French. Therefore in
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order to learn this new material, knowledge of a European language was required.
Learning to read in a European language now meant that in addition to the science
textbooks, the students could now read all sorts of European literature, including political
philosophy. Thus, “the new opening to West brought with it philosophy, literature, and
history, not only technology. For students it was a short step from volumes on technology
to volumes on revolution.” 22 Although the modernization period started out as a short
term project intended to save the Ottoman Empire, the changes introduce during the
Tanzimat slowly transformed the social fabric of Ottoman society and led to the
emergence of new political movements.
Although the Tanzimat reformers failed to achieve their ultimate goal of saving
the Ottoman Empire from further disintegration; it nonetheless had a long term effect on
the empire. The Young Ottoman, the Islamists, and the Young Turk movements were all
a product of the Tanzimat period. The Young Ottomans were part of the first opposition
movement that was highly critical of the regime. They particularly criticized the
Tanzimat reforms and felt that they were “superficial imitations of Europe that
disregarded traditional Ottoman and Islamic values.” The Young Ottomans felt that the
reforms not only failed to save the empire but they also made the empire submissive to
European interests. They believed the best way to keep the empire from dissolving was to
incorporate both Islamic and European values.

23

In addition to the Young Ottomans, a
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second opposition movement also emerged as a result of the Tanzimat reform. Members
of this group, unlike the Young Ottomans, solely emphasized Islamic values.
The new group that opposed the reforms of the Tanzimat period was the Islamists
who believed that in order to save the cultural identity of the Ottoman Empire, Islamic
values had to be brought back. Sultan Abdul Hamid II was the main advocate of this idea;
he saw Islam as the cement that would hold the population together. 24 The reign of Sultan
Abdul Hamid II combined with the changing internal and external environment were the
main contributing factors in the solidification of an Islamic identity within the
disintegrating Ottoman state. After the 1878 war, it was easy to advocate an Islamic
identity because the Muslims dominated what was left of the Ottoman Empire. As Russia
and Europe successfully annexed Ottoman territory, Muslim refugees from the Balkans,
Russian states, and other territories that were now under European rule, flooded into what
was left of the Ottoman state. Sultan Abdul Hamid took this opportunity to consolidate
his power and promote Islamic nationalism. 25 His goal was to promote Islamic
ideologies in order to prevent the spread of European ones that has began in the Tanzimat
era. Abdul Hamid and members of this Islamic movement were however unsuccessful in
achieving this goal, particularly because they were faced with immense opposition from
Young Turks, who were part of the new generation of Western elites.

24
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The Tanzimat reforms had also created a new generation of military bureaucrats
who were educated in the secular educational system that was established in that period.
The Young Turks were members of this new generation which was enlightened by the
secular and materialist ideas of the West. The Young Turks vehemently opposed the
absolutism of Sultan Abdul Hamid II’s rule and his Islamic ideas. They were strongly
influenced by their learning of European ways and honored the reforms carried out
during the Tanzimat. They in fact advocated for more Western institutions. Unlike the
Young Ottomans and the Islamists they were ready to discard the empire’s Islamic and
traditional values. 26 The Young Turk movement sparked the “tug of war between
conservatives and modernists,” which still lasts in contemporary Turkey. They frequently
demanded the implementation of Western reforms but were opposed by the Islamists who
accused them of alienating themselves from their own cultural and religious values. 27
1889, due to suppression from Abdul Hamid, members of the Young Turks fled to
France where they established the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP). The
Committee of Union and Progress had a new modern and western agenda in mind for the
Ottoman Empire. In 1908 they led the Young Turk Revolution against Abdul Hamid and
took control of the government. 28 Once in power they established a constitutional regime,
severely restricted the authority of the sultan, and began to secularize the judicial and
educational system, with the intention of undermining the old Islamic establishment. The
Young Turks however were unsuccessful in fully achieving their goal of transformation,
26

Bozdağlıoğlu, "Modernity, Identity and Turkey's Foreign Policy,” 58.

27
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mainly because World War I broke out and Turkey fought the war on the losing side. 29
Nonetheless, the Young Turks movement was unquestionably important, because the
reforms initiated in this period paved the way for Kemal Ataturk, the creator and
westernizer of modern Turkey. According to Stephen Kinzer, “[the Young Turks] built a
rich tradition of dissent that shaped the intellectual and political life of the late Ottoman
period and laid the foundation for Ataturk’s revolution.” 30 The Kemalist revolution that
began in the early 1920s was an inevitable result of the modernization efforts that had
began in the Ottoman Empire in the seventeenth and eighteenth century.
Ataturk & the Kemalist Reform Era
Modern-day Turkey owes its existence to Mustafa Kemal Ataturk who ruthlessly
transformed the nation and created the Republic of Turkey from the remaining ashes of
the Ottoman Empire. Ataturk believed that Turkey had fallen behind the West and thus
needed to become modernized as quickly as possible. He blamed the Ottoman Empire’s
decline on Islam and the religious values that had become so deeply embedded in Turkish
society throughout its Ottoman past. Ataturk despised these traditional values and once in
power he was willing to do everything to destroy them. In order to understand Kemal’s
views it is important to briefly examine his past.
Mustafa Kemal was born in 1881 in Salonika- modern-day Thessaloniki--to a
traditional Muslim family with modest means. His father died while he was young and he

29

Howard, History of Turkey, 76.
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was brought up by his mother. Like many Turkish mothers, she encouraged her son to
attend Quranic school and become a religious teacher. Mustafa Kemal however was a
rebellious young man and had no interest in religious teachings. Instead, Mustafa Kemal
decided to enroll in military school. 31 As a cadet he lived in Istanbul, which was one the
world’s most diverse and vibrant cities at the time. On his way to new posts he was also
able to travel to Europe and experience other modern capitals. As a man born in the West,
Mustafa Kemal had known only modern cosmopolitan cities. Furthermore, as a young
officer, Kemal was infatuated with Western ideas. He learned French and spent his time
reading Voltaire and Rousseau, and translated works of John Stuart Mill and Thomas
Hobbes. This exposure to Western writings deeply impacted his worldview and inflamed
his desire to save his country and bring it up to the standards of the Western civilization.
‘The Turkish nation has fallen far behind the West. The main aim should be to lead it to
modern civilization,’ he told an officer in Germany. 32 As Kemal Ataturk rose through the
military ranks, he made this his personal goal.
Ataturk’s resistance against the old Ottoman establishment began with his
participation in the Young Turk Revolution of 1908 as a military officer in which he
fought alongside the Young Turks and helped overthrow Sultan Abdul Hamid. 33 It was
during Sultan Abdul Hamid’s rule that the Ottoman Empire became known as the “sick
man of Europe,” and Kemal Ataturk was determined to change that. However, it was not
31

Stephen Kinzer, Crescent and Star: Turkey between Two Worlds, (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux,
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his participation in the Young Turk Revolution, but rather his victorious role in the
Turkish War of Independence, that won him recognition and legitimacy. After the defeat
of the Ottoman Empire in World War I, Mustafa Kemal was determined to save what was
left of the territory from the hands of the Allied forces. In the Turkish War of
Independence in 1919, Kemal successfully defeated the Allies in Anatolia and drove out
the Greeks from the west and the Armenians from the east. Another important
accomplishment under commander Kemal was his ability to convince the Allies to
discard the Sèvres Treaty, which essentially gave the Allies the right to carve out what
was left of the Ottoman Empire after its defeat in World War I. Under this treaty, Turkish
territory would be given to Greece, France, Britain, Italy, and the Armenians and Kurds
would also obtain land in order to form their own states in the east, leaving only central
Anatolia for the Turks. By replacing the Sèvres Treaty with the Treaty of Lausanne,
Mustafa Kemal was able to reclaim the land that was awarded to Greece, Italy, the Kurds,
and the Armenians. Having saved Turkish territory from the constant nibbling of
Christian powers, Mustafa Kemal readily abolished the Ottoman monarchy and
established the Republic of Turkey in 1923. 34 Now that Mustafa Kemal had dismantled
the monarchy and consolidated power as the first president of the Turkish Republic, he
was ready to fully unleash the drastic reforms that would forever change the nation.
Kemal Ataturk despised Islam and Turkey’s Ottoman past and was willing to do
everything in his power to prevent the old Ottoman traditions from becoming a part of its
secular future. His main aim was for Turkey to become part of the ‘contemporary
34

Ibid., 39‐42.
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civilization’ and by that he meant the Western civilization. Ataturk strongly believed that
in order for the Republic of Turkey to join the Western civilization, Turks had to become
modern, secular, and fully European in every aspect. For Ataturk this meant the complete
purging of Ottoman institutions and the Islamic religion. Ataturk viewed Islam as the
main cause of social, political, and economic decline. He equated Islam with
backwardness and found “civilization” and “Islam” to be two conflicting terms. 35
Once in power he began his ruthless Westernization movement by first abolishing
the caliphate, the most sacred institution of the Ottoman Empire. This crushing blow to
Islam was followed by the suspension of Islamic courts and the dissolution of religious
academic schools. Ataturk also repealed the constitutional clause which stated that Islam
was the religion of the Turkish state. His reforms however did not stop there. Kemal
Ataturk also attacked traditional clothing, by banning the fez and veil, which were both
symbols of Muslim identity. He also replaced the Muslim calendar with the Christian
one, and introduced a new language that was based off of Latin, completely altering the
old Turkish language which had Persian and Arabic roots. 36 Kemal Ataturk mercilessly
wiped away the traditional values of Turkish life that had taken centuries to build,
forcefully establishing Kemalism as the state’s official ideology.
Kemalism referred to Mustafa Kemal Ataturk’s reforms and ideology which
became the foundation of the Republic of Turkey. According to Ömer Taspinar,
Kemalism rests upon two pillars that fully define its ideology. The first pillar of
35
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Kemalism is a “revolutionary and militant version of secularism” and the other is
“assimilationist nationalism.” 37 In line with the first pillar, Kemalism was a stateenforced secular revolution in values and institutions. The aim was to root out Islam for
state institutions and fully control the religious sphere to avoid further decay of the
Turkish nation. The second pillar of “assimilationist nationalism,” meant the rejection of
the Ottoman concept of multinationalism and an emphasis on ‘Turkishness.’ This pillar
rested on the belief that in order for the new Turkish Republic to be a successful nation
all of its citizens had to be assimilated. Thus, anyone who lived within the border of the
Republic had to consider themselves only as Turks. Ataturk recognized non-Muslim
Turks as citizens but also discriminated against ethnic minorities, making the new
Turkish Republic less tolerant than the multireligious and multinational Ottoman
Empire. 38 This concept of Kemalism was embraced by a small group of secular elite and
military officers, known as the Kemalists. However, it failed to take root among the
greater population, particularly in the rural areas. The traditional masses of the rural
countryside held on to their Ottoman-Islamic values and refused to accept the concept of
Kemalism which deliberately aimed to destroy their Ottoman past. The Kurds, the
nation’s largest non-Turkish ethnic group, especially felt resentful towards Kemalism’s
secularization and assimilation efforts. For the Kurdish population the Islamic caliphate
symbolized unity and harmony under the Ottomans. Now that Ataturk had abolished the
caliphate and adopted “Turkishness” as the only acceptable form of identity, the “social

37
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contract” between the Kurds and the new Republic was broken. 39 Consequently, after
Ataturk’s westernization reforms, there was an inherent rift between the secular Kemalist
elite and the conservative masses.
Kemalism not only deeply impacted the internal dynamic of the Turkish Republic,
but it also left its mark on the nation’s foreign policy. On October 29, 1923, the day after
Kemal Ataturk created the Republic of Turkey he stated the foreign policy direction he
wanted the nation to follow in the future:
Our object now is to strengthen the ties that bind us to other nations. There may
be a great many countries in the world, but there is only one civilization, and if a
nation is to achieve progress, she must be a part of this civilization… The
Ottoman Empire began to decline the day when, proud of her successes against
the West, she cut ties that bound her to the European nations. We will not repeat
this mistake. 40
However, before being able to achieve this Western foreign policy objective, Ataturk was
aware that he first had to complete his domestic agenda. Thus, during the early years of
the Republic, Ataturk pursued and isolationist foreign policy. After 1923 the main
priority for Ataturk was to “consolidate the national independence won on the
battlefield,” 41 and to successfully transform and reconstruct the Western state he had in
mind. Furthermore, at the time the international environment was threatening to the new
found Republic. The Ottoman Empire had just recently been defeated by the Allied
Powers and had it not been for Ataturk the Turkish Republic would have been destroyed
by the European powers before it could even be born. Also, at the time Turkey’s
39
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neighborhood was prey to constant nibbling from European powers. 42 Realizing the tense
international atmosphere and the reality of possible exploitation by external powers
caused Ataturk to focus on his domestic efforts instead.
Although Turkey’s relations with the European powers were not at its best, its
relations with the Arab states were much worse. The abolishment of the caliphate by
Ataturk was one of the mains reasons for Turkey’s break with the Muslim world. At a
time when many Arab states were under European mandate control and feared that
Western imperialism would wipe out their Islamic traditions, the abolishment of the
caliphate by the only powerful Islamic empire was a tremendous blow to Muslims around
the world. Many Arab countries felt betrayed and abandoned by Turkey given the
growing Western threat in the region. 43 Arabs felt a strong sense of resentment towards
Kemalist Turkey for willingly abandoning the traditional Islamic roots that they were
trying so hard to protect. Ataturk on the other hand did not care for the Republic’s
relationship with the Arab world, mainly because he associated Islam and the Arab
culture with the backwards society that he had tried so hard to drag it away from. As
previously mentioned, Ataturk’s ultimate goal was for Turkey to become part of the
Western civilization and to maintain its ties with Europe. This goal however was not
achieved until a decade after Ataturk’s death (1938). In fact it was not until Cold War era
that Turkey fully established itself in the West.
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The Early Cold War Era
The Cold War era was a period of East-West division, in which Turkey firmly
aligned itself with the West and severely damaged its relations with the Arab states. It is
important to highlight that Turkey’s NATO membership and alignment with the West
was driven by its realist mentality and its security-driven objectives. Turkey’s foreign
policy in the early Cold War period was one dimensional and restricted due to the Soviet
threat and Turkey’s need for U.S. protection.
By the early 1940s, tensions rose between the aggressive Soviet Union and the
Turkish Republic. It was Joseph Stalin who initiated hostility towards Turkey and
damaged Turkish-Soviet relations. Stalin dissolved the 1921 Treaty of Moscow which
was a “friendship pact” that settled border disputes among them. He then renewed Soviet
demands for the return of Turkey’s eastern provinces of Kars and Ardahan. He also
claimed exclusive rights over the control of Turkish straits; the Bosphorus and the
Dardanelles and demanded the right to establish Soviet bases in Turkey. In addition to
these aggressive claims, the Soviet Union was rapidly expanding in to Eastern Europe
and moving closer towards Turkish territory. 44 With the advent of the Cold War and the
rising Soviet Power, Turkey quickly sought protection from the West.
Realizing Turkey’s regional importance, Washington, reached out to Turkey in
1952 and allowed the Republic to join NATO- the Western system of alliance against the
44
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Soviet threat. 45 NATO membership meant that Turkey was now an integral part of the
Western security system and a close ally of Washington. Turkey took this opportunity to
consolidate its Western identity and align its foreign policy with that of the United States.
Turkey’s Western element became particularly evident in its foreign policy towards the
Middle East as it allowed Western demands to dominate its actions in the region. For
example, in order to demonstrate its willingness to defend Western interests, Turkey
became the first Muslim country to recognize Israel, which was an invisible NATO
member and a close ally of the U.S. Furthermore, Turkey became the main advocate of
the Baghdad pact, the Washington-sponsored anti-Soviet alliance in the Middle East.
Turkey helped create the Baghdad pact in 1955, which was a security agreement between
the United Kingdom, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, and Turkey. The goal was to deter Soviet
influence in the broader Middle East. Iraq was the only Arab state that had joined the
agreement (which it later abandoned after the 1958 coup); other Arab nations were either
preoccupied with the Arab-Israeli conflict or had established themselves in the Soviet
camp. 46 Turkey’s anti-Soviet stance and Western alignment caused much hostility from
the Arab states who accused Turkey of selling its soul to the West. A series of actions
confirmed this accusation: In 1995 Turkey warned the government of Jordan that if it
failed to join the Baghdad pact, Turkey would align itself with Israel against Jordan; in
the same year Turkey voted against Algeria’s independence at the United Nations; in
1957, concerned about the possibility of the communists gaining power in Damascus,
Turkey massed troops along its shared border with Syria and threaten to invade the
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country. 47 These actions not only reaffirmed Turkey’s Western orientation, but also
further deteriorated its relations with the East.
The international dynamics of the Cold War and the serious security threats
Turkey faced from the expanding Soviet Union, caused Turkey to seek protection under
the Western security umbrella. Turkey’s NATO membership certainly increased its
Western credentials; however its move towards the West was not so much driven by
ideology as it was by security concerns. Once Turkey entered the Western camp, it
allowed Western policy, particularly U.S. policy, to completely dictate its international
relations. This resulted in further restriction of Turkey’s foreign relations, because in
addition to losing its eastern neighbors in the Caucasus and Central Asia to Soviet
expansion, Turkey’s relations with the Arab states were also severely damaged. Given the
international environment, and the Soviet threat, Turkey sided with the West in order to
ensure its nation’s protection, this move hurt Turkey’s eastern relations, but won Turkey
western legitimacy.
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CHAPTER 2- Domestic Tensions & the Battle for Turkey’s Soul
The end of single-party rule brought about an intriguing problem within Turkey,
one that persisted for half a century. In 1950, for the first time in Turkish history, the
Kemalists (the secular elite and the military who espouse Ataturk’s ideology of
nationalism and secularism) introduced democratic rule, however ironically enough, they
then spent the next fifty years repressing it. The Kemalist elite overthrew four
democratically elected governments and continuously intervened in politics in protection
of the Kemalist ideology and ultimately their own self interest. Through their constant
meddling in politics, the Kemalists’ managed to marginalize the majority of the
population who grew increasingly disillusioned with the state ideology and its repressive
measures. By the 80s and 90s changes within Turkish society led to the empowerment of
the traditionally conservative masses and the emergence of Islamic political parties. The
Islamic political parties represented an alternative to Kemalism and thus won the support
of the disillusioned masses.
The Republican People’s Party (RPP), the political party of Ataturk and the Kemalist
elite, ruled the country for nearly three decades. 48 Kemalism was the main ideology of
the RPP and the Kemalists were its official guardians. As previously mentioned, the
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Kemalists were the secular elite and the Turkish military who had helped Ataturk create
the new Turkish Republic. The secular elite included security officers, Western women,
judges, bureaucrats, professors, media owners, journalists and newspaper editors, who
strongly supported the secular nature of the state. 49 For decades they monopolized the
most important institutions of the state and had the instruments of power under their
control. The army, the judiciary, newspapers, and the media were dominated by the
Kemalist elite, allowing them to crush any and all movements that seemed particularly
threatening to Kemalism. The Kemalist elite have a very insecure mentality in that they
are constantly in fear of emerging threats; “they see threats from across every one of
Turkey’s eight borders, and most dangerously, from within the country itself.” 50 This
idea of safeguarding Kemalist principles from internal challenges made the protection of
Kemalism a matter of national security for the elite class, particularly the military. By
internalizing the concept of national security, the Kemalist elite were able to legitimize
their role as the guardians and strengthen their hold on the state. 51 The Kemalists enjoyed
full political dominance from 1923 to 1945. By 1945 however, the repressive tendencies
of the RPP had caused widespread dissatisfaction among Turkish society.
The rural population and the traditional masses had opposed the RPP’s rule and its
Kemalist ideology from the start. They felt no loyalty and connection to the RPP. The
majority of the traditional population despised the secularism of the state and the top49
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down, forceful manner in which the Kemalist reforms were carried out. The stagnant
economy under the RPP further fueled anti-government sentiment. The economic policies
of the RPP were illiberal and ineffective and caused much opposition among villagers
and businessmen. The villagers resented the increase in taxation and the government’s
inattention to the agricultural sector which pushed them further into poverty. The
businessmen were especially hit hard by the increase in taxation. They opposed the RPP’s
economic programme because it prohibited private enterprise which the businessmen
were strongly in favor of. In addition to the hostility in the general public, members
within the RPP were also dissatisfied with the illiberal economic and political
environment of the state. By 1945, due to widespread hostility in Turkish society and
pressure from dissidents within the RPP, the government was forced to gradually open up
the political system. 52
In January 1946 the dissidents within the RPP formed the Democrat Party (DP).
Although members of the DP were also Kemalists and upheld the Kemalism ideology of
the state, they were much more liberal minded then the RPP. They favored a more open
political and economic system and wanted to curtail the interventionist state and enhance
the individual rights of the citizens. Realizing the serious political threat posed by the DP,
the government called early elections in May 1946 in order to catch the DP off guard
before they could have time to organize and win public support. This plan worked, and
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the RPP won the 1946 elections. Even though the elections were marred by corruption,
the DP managed to win 65 votes. 53
Given the unfair advantage of the RPP the 1946 elections cannot be considered free
elections. The Republic’s first free and fair elections were in fact held in 1950. By 1950
the DP had become the “umbrella under which all who mistrusted or opposed the current
government sought refuge.” 54 In May 1950, Turkish voters expressed their resentment
towards the RPP and voted the Democrat Party into office with an absolute majority. 55
Adnan Menderes became the Prime Minister and main representative of the DP. The fact
that the RPP had allowed democratic rule and accepted the verdict of the voter, was
viewed as a “turning-point in the history of modern Turkey” and a “step forward for the
democratic process.” 56 However, this change was not as dramatic as it was perceived to
be. Despite the introduction of the multi-party system, the Kemalist elite were not ready
to embrace democratic rule. This was in fact the beginning of a façade democracy. In the
next four decades that followed, between 1960 and 2000, the Kemalists would allow
democratic elections and initially accept the new government, but would then intervene
and overthrow the elected officials and close down their political parties. Following the
introduction of the multi-party political system, the military staged four coups (1960,
1971, 1980, and 1997), banned dozens of opposition parties, and arrested and tortured
thousands of political activists.
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In 1960, the military staged its first coup against the Democrat Party for easing
Islamic restrictions and threatening the Kemalists political power. Adnan Menderes, who
was prime minister between 1950 and 1960, was the first political leader who tested the
rules of the secularist establishment. He differed from the Kemalist elite on two important
matters: one was in regards to the role of military in politics and the other was
secularism. Menderes favored a more relaxed secularism and preferred less military
bureaucracy, both of which created unease among the elite, particularly the former. 57
Menderes began the transformation of the repressive and interventionist Turkish state by
introducing free-market economic policies and allowing religious freedom. Unlike the
Kemalists, Menderes did not feel threatened by religion and was willing to identify with
Islam in order to maintain his popularity. He allowed mosques to be built and religious
schools to open in many cities and Islamic books to reappear in bookshelves. He also
allowed the Muslim call to prayer to be done in Arabic and repealed the law created by
the RPP which required it to be chanted in Turkish. The DP also repealed the ban on
religious organizations that were previously suppressed by the RPP. 58
Menderes realized that his religious tolerance was winning him support and so he
began to use more pro-Islam rhetoric in his political speeches. His use of Islam as a
political force certainly succeeded in winning the support of the rural population. It did
not however sit well with the Kemalists who saw Menderes and his Democrat Party as a
grave threat to the Republic’s secular foundation. This threat was magnified by internal
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transformation of Turkish cities. Starting in the 40s and 50s there were large-scale
migrations from the countryside to the cities. These migrants were the religiously
conservative masses of Turkey that had long been ignored by the Kemalist elite. They
brought in their religious practices along with them and contributed to the renewed
visibility of Islam within Turkish cities. 59 The migration of the traditional masses coupled
with the DP’s religious concessions, caused the RPP to react to what it perceived to be
the increasing Islamisation of the Turkish Republic. In 1960, the Kemalists responded by
not only overthrowing the government, but also hanging the Prime Minister and two of
his cabinet members on charges of treason. 60 The 1960 coup of Adnan Menderes was a
clear warning by the Kemalist elite, that if any politician dared to bend the rules of the
secular establishment, they would have to pay a high price. In addition to revealing the
Kemalists’ ruthlessness, the 1960 coup also revealed their ambivalence towards and fear
of democracy.
Kemalists felt threatened by the introduction of democracy in the Republic because
they knew maintaining the status quo would become much more difficult. Their main
goal was to protect and preserve Kemalism and the secular nature of the state. Knowing
that the majority of the people held on to the traditional and religious values of the
Ottoman past made Kemalists increasingly hesitant in fully implementing democracy in
Turkey. Many Kemalists felt that “full democracy would increase ethnic tensions,
religious devotion and every form of social conflict. Even more profoundly, they believed
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it would become a weapon for those who seek to drag Turkey back to the pre-Kemalist
era.” 61 The ruling elite also feared multiparty democracy because it meant losing power.
For more than two decades after the creation of the Republic, the elite enjoyed full
political autonomy as it was the only party allowed to govern. With the introduction of
the multi-party system in 1950, the elite saw power slip right through its hands. The
Kemalists came to the realization that now that multiparty democracy was introduced in
Turkey, in order to stay in control and maintain their political power they needed to
create an institution that would legitimize their role in politics.
After the 1960 military intervention, the military amended the constitution carving up
a new institution, called the National Security Council, which would guarantee the
military officers a direct say in political affairs of the state. The National Security
Council gave the chief of staff and the armed forces the right to “assist” cabinet members
‘in making decisions related to national security and co-ordination.’ The military officers
intentionally used the term ‘national security,’ not only because it legitimized their
political role, but also because the term was so broad that it allowed the commanders to
have a direct say in dealing with virtually all national problems that came before the
government. The Constitution now allowed the military to assume executive power
without being held accountable to citizens. 62 In the next four decades the military, backed
by the Constitution, used its executive power to further monopolize and control the state.
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In the 1960s and 1970s the Kemalists were faced with a wide range of new threats as
forms of socialism, communism, Islamism, and anti-communism emerged within Turkey.
A leftist party known as the Turkish Workers’ Party and rightist group known as the
Republican Peasants’ Nation Party were formed in the 60s. Also in 1970 the first Islamist
party known as the National Order Party was established. The Cold War atmosphere and
the open environment in universities encouraged discourse as the emergence of new ideas
led to the politicization of Turkish society. By the late 1960s extremists groups appeared
on both the Left and the Right and the public gradually became polarized between the
two. In late 1967 violence broke out among the leftist and rights groups as Turkey slipped
into civil unrest. 63 The political instability and the perceived erosion of Kemalism caused
the military to intervene and overthrow the government both in 1971 and 1980. The civil
unrest “prompted the populace at large to give their full support to military action without
worrying about its anti-democratic nature.” 64 This further enhanced the role of the
military and strengthened its sense of self-importance as the sole guardians of the
Republic. The next several years that followed were marked by severe political
oppression.
After the 1980 coup, the military officers dissolved the parliament and banned all
political parties. Trade unions and political parties were closed down and their leaders
were imprisoned and tortured. Between 1980 and 1983 alone, approximately 60,000
people were arrested for “illegal political activities” and more than one million were
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blacklisted. 65 Furthermore, from 1980 to 1984, more than 300 people were “suspiciously
killed,” and 171 died from being tortured in prison. In addition to political activists,
journalists, judges, and university professors were also fired and imprisoned. 66 Anyone
that the military labeled as “anti-Kemalist” or perceived to be threatening Kemalism
faced similar repressive measures. 67 The brutal response of the military to domestic
political opposition after the 1971 and 1980 coups fully revealed the military’s
authoritarian streak.
After the 1980 coup the military decided that Turkey was neither ready nor worthy of
democracy. In 1982 the Kemalist elite created a new constitution further limiting the
democratic rights and liberties of the Turks. The section of the constitutions curtailing
democratic freedoms stated:
‘fundamentalist rights and freedoms maybe restricted by law, in conformity with the
letter and spirit of the Constitution, with the aim of safeguarding the indivisible integrity of
the state with its territory and nation, national sovereignty, the Republic, national security,
public order, general peace, the public interest, public morals and public health.’

Additionally, after every article that acknowledged freedom of speech and the press, a
sentence or two was added on how these rights could be restricted ‘for the purpose of
preventing crime.” 68 Twenty years after the second constitutional amendment, the military
once again found a way to limit the rights of civilians while enhancing its own. Under
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this new constitution, the government was required to give ‘priority consideration’ to the
decisions and recommendations of the National Security Council. The military could now
formulate and implement laws pertaining to matters of national security. 69 In the next
years that followed, the military used this power to completely depoliticize Turkey and
repress the political left which it deemed particularly threatening at the time. In order to
completely destroy the leftist ideology and counter its appeal the Kemalists eased the
pressure on Islam. Although this tactic may have been useful in the short-term in helping
the Kemalists combat communism and leftist ideologies, in the long run it proved to be
counter-productive. By strengthening the role of Islam the Kemalists fueled the rise of
political Islam and contributed to their own downfall.
After the 1980 coup, the military maintained controlled for three years and
completely purged the political parties that had emerged in the 60s and 70s. With the precoup parties still banned, new ones were formed in order to compete in the 1983
elections. One of only three parties approved to participate in the post-coup elections was
the center-right Motherland Party created by Turgut Özal. 70 The public knew very little
about Özal and his political agenda. They did know however that that unlike the leaders
of the other two parties, Özal was not an ex-general and was not a representative of the
Kemalist establishment. This was enough for the masses to give him a stunning victory in
the 1983 national elections. 71 Once in power, Özal unleashed a set of political and
economic reforms that transformed Turkey into a liberal and democratic country. The
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fact that Özal was anti-Communist made the generals less fearful of his government and
his domestic agenda which was very religiously tolerant. While in power with support
from the military which was promoting a “Turkish-Islamic synthesis” that would counter
the appeal of leftist ideology, Özal strengthened the role of Islam. In the 1980s under
Özal’s government 1,500 new mosques were built every year. By 1988 there was a
mosque for every 857 people in Turkey. Özal also allowed conservative Muslims to
obtain positions in ministries and state bureaucracies. 72 In addition to his social and
political policies, Özal also carried out economic reforms.
Özal completely transformed Turkey’s protectionist and “inward-looking” economy.
He introduced liberal free-market policies and turned Turkey into an export-oriented state
which helped the Turkish economy experience growth after years of stagnation. 73 Özal
also decreased bureaucratic procedures and allowed business to flourish in Turkey.
Before he came to power, opening up a business was a torturous bureaucratic process.
Now anybody could easily start their own business, and hundreds of thousands of people
did. Industries were privatized and Turkey became a consumer society. 74 Özal’s political
and economic reform package gradually weakened the position of the Kemalist
establishment because it removed the state’s control over the economy. His reforms
empowered the traditionally conservative masses instead.
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Özal’s reforms liberated the traditional masses that were now freer to practice their
religion, open up businesses, publish and broadcast Islamic ideas and obtain government
positions. Özal’s free-market policies strengthened the role of conservative Muslims by
elevating their economic status. Entrepreneurship and business flourished in a number of
Turkish cities that used to be economically stagnant. Thanks to his economic
liberalization, “sleepy backwaters” of Turkey became known as the ‘Anatolian Tigers,’ 75
and a new class of conservative businessmen emerged. The businessmen of the Anatolian
tigers would later on become the support base for Islamic political parties. The
conservative population now had more economic and political tools at its disposal and
was thus able to make its demands known. Özal’s reforms empowered three varied
groups within Turkey: the Muslim business class of the Anatolian tigers, the lower
classes in the cities, and the Islamic intellectual class. 76 By allowing these groups to have
a stronger voice in Turkish society, Özal’s political and economic liberalization provided
the grounds for the rise of Islamic political parties.
The 1980s marked the beginning of the long-lasting power struggle between the
Islamists and Kemalists. The first Islamic political leader that seriously confronted the
Kemalist establishment was Necmettin Erbakan, who in the 80s was known as the
unchallenged leader of the Islamic political movement.” 77 Necmettin Erbakan established
the first Islamic political party, called the National Order Party in 1970. However, its
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existence was short-lived as it was among the parties banned after the 1971 coup. In
1980, Erbakan restarted the party under a new name, the National Salvation Party. 78
Once again it was dissolved after the 1980 coup. In the 70s Erbakan was not seen as a
serious threat and his political moves were overshadowed by the violence that broke out
between the Left and the Right. Thus, it was not until the 80s that he really began to
politically challenge Kemalism. In 1983, Erbakan reentered the political scene and
formed a third party, known as the Welfare Party (WP). 79 The liberal environment of the
80s under Özal allowed Erbakan to strengthen his political stance and expand his support
base.
In the 80s the Erbakan’s Welfare Party became very popular, particularly among the
traditional rural masses that were in search of a party that would represent their Islamic
identity and meet their basic needs. Erbakan vehemently spoke out against Kemalism and
called for a return to Islamic values. He promised the elimination of social inequality and
corruption, which was rampant among the Kemalist elite. The party’s growing popularity
became evident in the 1990s. In the 1994 municipal elections, the WP won twenty eight
mayoral seats (out of the seventy six) in provincial capitals. What particularly shocked
the Kemalists was that Islamists were elected in Istanbul and Ankara, Turkey’s largest
cities. The Welfare Party also won the most votes in the 1995 national election. 80 The
core of Erbakan’s support base included conservative Muslims who voted him into
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office. However, he also gained votes from those who were not particularly religious.
Erbakan’s diverse proponents had different views on the role of Islam in politics. All they
really had in common was a shared feeling of disillusionment with the Kemalist
establishment. While the Kemalist elite were known for their dishonestly and corruption,
Welfare Party mayors and politicians, whom led modest lives were known as the only
honest, caring, and socially conscious party in Turkey. 81 The WP’s electoral success and
wide-spread popularity fueled a sense of insecurity among the Kemalist elite who felt that
the party posed a serious threat to the secular nature of the state.
Erbakan’s foreign policy views were particularly provocative and unacceptable to the
Kemalist elite. A few weeks before the 1995 election, Erbakan gave fiery speeches
promising to launch a jihad and recapture Jerusalem from the Zionists and save Turkey
from the ‘unbelievers of Europe.’ He also pledged to ‘create an Islamic currency, an
Islamic United Nations, and Islamic NATO, and an Islamic version of the European
Union.’ 82 Erbakan’s anti-Israel and anti-West rhetoric and reference to pan-Islamic ideas
led Kemalists to believe that the Welfare Party would reorient Turkish foreign policy
away from the West towards the Islamic Middle East. With the elections getting closer,
the secularists and the leading military officials feared that their worst nightmare would
come true and an Islamic party would finally rule the government and destroy its secular
identity at home and its Western oriented foreign policy abroad. Thus the Kemalist elite
felt the need to immediately act and stop what they perceived to be the Islamisation of
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Turkey’s domestic and foreign policy. Although the Welfare Party came out of the 1995
election with the most votes, the Kemalist elite forcefully brokered a coalition
government between two center-Right parties that had initially split up, in order to
prevent Erbakan from becoming prime minister. However, the two center-right parties
once again split up, and the military imposed coalition collapsed. Erbakan, determined to
seize power, formed a coalition government with the True Path Party, 83 as the army
watched Erbakan became Turkey’s first Islamic-oriented prime minister.
As Prime Minister, Erbakan implemented some of his foreign policy ideas and began
developing closer ties with Islamic countries. He made trips to Iran and Libya supporting
Islamic leaders in the hope that Turkey would soon regain the Islamic leadership position
it held as the main protector of the Muslim caliphate. 84 In addition to his foreign policy
he was also proactive in his domestic policies. Once in power, radical elements of the WP
gradually became evident which further heightened Kemalists’ distrust of the party. In
one instance WP members tried to oust secular-minded judges and replace them with
Islamist judges. Also, attempts were made by WP parties to separate men and women on
transportation systems. Also, several educational centers for women were closed down
and sometimes replaced with Quranic schools. 85 By 1997, the Kemalist elite had seen
enough and was fully determined to find a way to overthrow the Welfare Party.
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On February 4th 1997, an event that was hosted by a Welfare Party mayor, a follower
of Erbakan, triggered the fourth coup. On this day the Iranian ambassador was invited to
an Islamic rally in Sincan, where he demanded sharia law in Turkey. 'Do not be afraid to
call yourself fundamentalists! Fundamentalists are those who follow the words and
actions of the Prophet,' he shouted to the Turks. For the Kemalist elite this was the “last
straw.” The following day, the military responded by sending in tanks through the streets
of Ankara into Sincan as a clear sign that the end was near for the Welfare Party. 86 On
February 28th 1997, the government was forced to sign a list of military demands
agreeing to fully adhere to and protect the secularist ideology of the Republic. In the
months that followed, the Kemalists tightened the pressure on Erbakan by launching a
national campaign against political Islam and issuing several warnings against his
government. The pressure eventually led to the resignation of Erbakan in what became
known as the “post-modern coup.” In 1998 the Kemalists dissolved the Welfare Party and
banned Erbakan from political activity for five years. 87 The 1997 post-modern coup had a
significant impact on Turkey’s Islamic political movement. According to Omer Taspinar,
it “paved the way for soul-searching among Turkey’s Islamists, eventually causing a
generational and ideological rift within their movement.” 88 The WP’s persecution
convinced the reformist wing of the party to strengthen its moderate views and distance
itself from the from the party’s Islamist agenda.
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Tayyip Erdoğan officially entered the political scene in 1994 when he won the
mayoral seat in Istanbul in the 1994 municipal elections. As mayor he had built up a
reputation as a charismatic and populist leader and was credited by the public for
improving services. When the Welfare Party was formally banned in 1997, Erdoğan
along with other Islamic politicians joined the Virtue Party (VP), which was the
successor the WP. 89 Erdoğan’s role in the Virtue Party was short-lived however as he
was banned from politics in 1998 by the National Security Court for reciting a verse from
an old Turkish poem. During a campaign speech, Erdoğan read the verse: ‘the mosques
are our barracks, the domes are our helmets, the minarets are our spears, and the faithful
are our army.’ The army which was already looking to come up with a case against
Erdoğan and members of the Virtue Party seized on this old poem, claiming that it
revealed Erdoğan’s intention of destroying secularism. As a result, Erdoğan was
convicted, banned from politics, and sentenced to then months in jail. 90 The Kemalists
kept up the fight against the Virtue Party. They opened up a case against the VP in 1991
and closed down the party in June 2001. 91 This was a turning point for Tayyip Erdoğan
and the moderate members of the Islamic party who had learned that in order to avoid
being persecuted they had to solidify their moderate views and abandon the Virtue Party.
Despite being constitutionally barred from participating in politics, Erdoğan
continued to manage the political affairs of the reformist faction. He was determined to
reenter the political scene. In August 2001, Erdoğan and Abdullah Gul, another moderate
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Islamic leader, founded the Justice and Development Party (AKP). 92 Abdullah Gul took
up the leadership position while Erdoğan worked behind the scenes. With the national
elections less than a year away, the AKP launched a successful grass-root political
campaign. The AKP distanced itself from the anti-secular and anti-Western stance of the
past Islamic parties and instead campaigned as a ‘conservative democratic party’ and
advocated for political freedom, economic liberalism, and human rights. AKP policies
blended in elements of Islam, capitalism, and democracy, something no secular party in
Turkey had ever done. Also unlike Erbakan, AKP leaders emphasized the importance of
Turkey’s relations with the West and even promised to pursue Turkey’s EU membership.
AKP’s moderate Islamic views and pro-market and pro-EU stance won the support of the
Turkish population. On November 3rd, 2002, only fourteen months after its creation, AKP
won Turkey’s national elections, obtaining 34% of the vote, forming the first majority
government in decades. 93 Soon after gaining power, AKP lawmakers lifted the ban on
Erdoğan, clearing his path to the prime minister's seat. In the July 2007 elections
Erdoğan’s AKP proved to be even more victorious and popular, winning more than 46%
of the vote. 94 Erdoğan’s ‘conservative democratic party’ has been able to successfully
rule Turkey for almost a decade now without military intervention.
After coming to power in 2002, Erdoğan launched an impressive reform package,
which has transformed Turkey into a vibrant and prosperous democratic nation. Through
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its economic reforms, AKP has put an end to Turkey’s macroeconomic instability.
Turkey’s economic growth rate has been steady and strong, and trade and foreign
investment values have shot up. Even more impressive are the constitutional reforms that
the AKP has carried out. Through its constitutional amendments Erdoğan has undermined
the power of the Kemalist elite, particularly the military. In 2003, Erdoğan altered the
National Security Council, the military’s most important institution. He reduced the
number of officers on the Council from five to one, brought in civilians, and ultimately
took away the officer’s executive power. 95 The most astonishing reform that deliberately
limited the role of the military was just recently passed in 2010 through Turkey’s
referendum.

On September 12, 2010, AKP won a landmark referendum which introduced 26
constitutional amendments to the 1982 constitution that was created by the Kemalist elite
after the 1980 coup. 96 Some of these amendments include collective bargaining rights,
privacy rights, gender equality, and protection for children, veterans, the elderly, and the
disabled. The reform package also includes provisions that: empower civilian courts
while reducing the jurisdiction of military courts, remove immunities provided to the
generals responsible for the 1980 military coup, and changes the procedures for banning
political parties, and alters the composition of the Constitutional Court and the Supreme
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Board of Judges and Prosecutors to check the power of the military elite. 97 The fact that
the referendum decreased the power of the military and also coincided with the 30th
anniversary of the 1980 military coup caused much controversy among the Kemalist elite
who strongly opposed the constitutional amendments. They interpreted the referendum as
an “orchestrated power grab aimed at undermining the secular order.” The AKP and its
supporters however, view the referendum as the liberalization of the Turkish political
order. They argue that the amendments go a long way to make Turkey a democratic
nation and that the curtailing of the military is a good thing for Turkish democracy.
Erdoğan himself has asserted that “the main message out of the ballot boxes is that our
nation said yes to advanced democracy, yes to freedoms, yes to the superiority of law —
not the law of the superiors — and yes to the sovereignty of national will.” 98 It is not
surprising that the Kemalist elite feel threatened by these amendment changes. The
referendum without a doubt cripples the power of the old Kemalist elite.

The secular elite and the military have monopolized the state institutions for decades
and have suppressed democracy in order to maintain their power. The fact that Turks
approved the reforms suggests strong support for the liberalization of the militarydominated constitution and the need for more democratic institutions. By approving the
changes, many Turks demanded an end to the military’s constant intervention. “The

97

Asli U. Bali, "Unpacking Turkey's "Court‐Packing" Referendum," Middle East Report Online, November 5,
2011, http://www.merip.org/mero/mero110510.html.

98

Bilefsky, "Turkish Reforms Pass by Wide Margin."

42

depth of support for the referendum reflects a generational shift and the anti-military
orientation” of the majority of the population in Turkey, Asli Bali has concluded in his
analysis of the 2010 referendum. Asli Bali also suggests the “end of guardianship” for the
military as a result of amendments. 99

No one has been able to challenge the Kemalists’ monopoly of power as
successfully as the AKP. The AKP government has won the battle for Turkey’s soul. It
has overthrown and weakened the old Kemalist establishment and its actions have been
backed by the majority of Turkish people. The Kemalists contributed to their own
downfall through years of military intervention and political repression. Their constant
meddling in politics and resistance to change led to the marginalization of the masses
who were dissatisfied with Kemalism and the secular elite’s inability to meet their
demands. Changes on the domestic scene allowed Islamic parties to enter the political
scene and contributed to the rise of a provincial middle class that was much more
conservative and traditional than the old elite, who governed the country under a strict
secular establishment. The AKP, a product of the transformation of Turkish political
Islam, became the political representative of the new empowered traditional masses,
which found the party’s democratic and conservative stance particularly appealing. As
the Turkish-American scholar Hakan Yavuz has stated, “now the [masses] are not a
subject but an object of their own destiny. They do not want to be defined by the state but
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seek to define the state instead.” 100 They have expressed their dissatisfaction with the
rigid Kemalist state ideology and have willfully chosen the AKP as their representative.
Since its rise to power in 2002, the AKP has remained loyal to its “conservative
democracy” label by initiating reforms that have both restored the role of Islam in
Turkish society and have limited the power of the military, the main opposing force
against change and democracy.
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CHAPTER 3 – Turkey’s Relations with the West
Turkey and Europe
Turkey’s Europeanization efforts date back to its Ottoman past. As previously
mentioned, it was in the seventeenth and eighteenth century that that the Ottomans began
to look towards Europe in order to save the Empire from further decline. Faced with
technologically advanced and superior European powers, the Ottomans began to adopt
their use of science and technology and established similar Western institutions. During
the Tanzimat period especially, demands for modernization led to the emulation of the
“material aspects of Western civilization.” 101 This process of Europeanization was
radically accelerated in the early twentieth century with the creation of the Turkish
Republic under Kemal Ataturk. Ataturk’s ruthless westernization perpetuated a desire for
further affiliation with the West, particularly with Europe.
Turkey was able to gradually align itself with the West as it gained membership in
some of the most important European and transatlantic institutions. Turkey became a
member of the Council of Europe in 1949, the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD) in 1961 and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe (OSCE) in 1973. 102 Despite membership in these major Western organizations,
Turkey’s Europeanization goal remains incomplete because in spite of years of
persistence and dedication, Turkey has yet to become a member of the most important
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European organization: the European Union. Turkey’s road towards EU integration has
been quite bumpy, long, and arduous. Turkey’s official European Union accession talks
began in October 2005, more than forty years after it first sought membership in the
European bloc. Six years later, Turkey has yet to gain full membership and is unsure it
ever will. The European Union considers Turkey’s negotiation as “open-ended,” 103
meaning there is no guarantee that Turkey will become a full member.
Turkey first expressed interest in joining what was then the European Economic
Community (EEC) in 1959 when there were only six members. It signed an Association
Agreement, also known as the Ankara Agreement, with EEC in 1963, which was seen as
a possible stepping stone to full membership. 104 The main aim of the EEC at the time was
economic integration, thus the Association Agreement was limited to financial and trade
matters. At the time Turkey followed an inward looking and protectionist economic
policy, which made its economy incompatible with that of the European Community. As
Southern European nations, such as Portugal, Greece, and Spain, liberalized their
economies and gained membership in the EC, Turkey failed to integrate itself into the
European core. By the 1980s however, thanks to Özal’s sweeping free-market reforms,
Turkey began to experience economic growth and became closer to meeting membership
requirements. In 1987, Özal submitted Turkey’s official application for full membership.
Although under Özal Turkey had made significant progress in meeting the economic
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aspects of membership, its economy was still extremely underdeveloped. Thus, in 1989
the EC rejected Turkey’s membership, citing mainly economic reasons. 105
The EC was still adjusting to its recent South European enlargement and felt that
it would be “unwise” to consider beginning another round of enlargement at the time.
The EC argued that the timing was bad given that they were preoccupied with
establishing a single market by 1992 and still had internal structural problems to tackle.
Additionally, they felt that Turkey would be a financial burden on the EC and weaken
their economic integration capabilities. In its formal rejection of Turkey’s membership,
the EC stated “despite the positive features of the recent developments in Turkey… its
general level of development is substantially lower than the European average.” 106
Although political reasons were also briefly mentioned and suggestions were made on
improving the human rights situation in Turkey, the main emphasize was on Turkey’s
underdeveloped economy.
By the late 1980s and early 1990s, there was a significant transformation in the
EC’s approach to enlargement which further complicated Turkey’s chances of gaining
membership. By the late 1980s however, the EC was no longer merely an economic
organization. After the Southern enlargement which resulted in the entry of Greece in
1981 and Spain and Portugal in 1986, the EC began to increasingly focus on political
aspects of membership, in addition to the economic requirements. This was largely due to
the fact that Greece, Spain, and Portugal were still transitioning from dictatorial regimes
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and the EC considered it a priority to help stabilize democracy in these countries. Thus
political stability and democratic criteria were now increasingly viewed as an essential
requirement for future members. Additionally, according to Stephen Larrabee and Ian
Lesser, after the Southern enlargement by the late 80s, the EC gradually transformed
from being a “primarily and economic club of Northern industrialized countries,” to a
European institution that now represented “shared norms, values, and codes of behavior
among its members.” 107 This shift in EC’s focus on shared views and political norms,
further separated Turkey from the pattern of political development in the rest of Europe,
largely because of its domestic instability. The domestic political upheaval in Turkey
heightened by the series of military coups in 1960, 1971, and 1980 severely undermined
Turkey’s chances. 108 The harsh political oppression under the Kemalists and military
elite further strengthened European opposition to Turkish membership who saw a country
that was not only economically backwards but was also in political turmoil. As the EC
formally introduced specific political criteria for membership at the Copenhagen summit
in 1993, Turkey’s quest for membership became significantly more difficult.
The Copenhagen criteria now required potential member states to achieve a stable
democracy, uphold the rule of law, respect human rights, and protect minority rights.
These were the areas that Turkey required the most reform and the issues the Kemalists
were least enthusiastic about addressing. Turkish generals and their secular comrades
realized that these democratic reforms would undermine their monopoly of power and
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give voice to the political and social groups that they had tried so hard to suppress. Thus
in public they supported Turkey’s EU accession but in reality they ultimately refused to
take the necessary steps to join. 109 As the EC (and later the EU) began to give greater
weight to democratic requirements, a clear contradiction in Turkey’s EU aspirations was
revealed. The Kemalists were fond of the idea of joining the European bloc and
solidifying Turkey’s Western alliance, because for many joining the EU meant the
fulfillment of Ataturk’s European vision. However, since EU accession also meant
political liberalization and democratization, the Kemalists deliberately ignored EU
requirements.
By the late 1990s however, internal changes in Turkey sparked an appetite for EU
membership. Liberal-minded politicians, businessmen, as well as religious intellectuals,
began to demand a greater voice in politics and society and thus pressured the Kemalists
to seriously pursue EU membership. They saw the EU accession process as the best way
to complete Turkey’s democratization. For the devout Muslims, membership meant
greater religious freedom and for persecuted groups such as the Kurds, it meant a
guarantee of cultural rights, which they were fully aware of. Political and economic
advantages of EU membership were also recognized by businessmen and various
politicians who were enthusiastic about liberal reforms. The Turkish parliament
responded to these demands by passing a set of reforms. 110 However, they were not
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enough in convincing the EC to let Turkey in. In 1997, Turkey faced its harshest rejection
ever from the European Community.
In 1997, during the Luxemburg Summit, the EU ratified the candidacy of twelve
countries, including eleven East European and Baltic countries and also Cyprus. Turkey
however was not acknowledged as an official candidate nor offered a timetable for
accession. 111 Instead it was offered a vague ‘strategy of rapprochement’ and told to
continue improving its human rights and treatment of minorities. The EU’s refusal in
recognizing Turkey as a candidate caused a wave of outrage in Turkey. Turkey
immediately limited contact with the European bloc and froze political dialogue with
Europe. 112 Turks were especially offended because they felt that the EU was applying
double standards to Turkey. It is true that Turkey at the time was far from being a full
democracy but the eleven European countries that were accepted as candidate countries
were not vibrant democracies either. They were also less economically advanced than
Turkey. 113 The Turkish Prime Minister at the time, Mesut Yilmaz, responsible for cutting
diplomatic ties with the EU, expressed Turkish frustration by stating: “the aspect of the
Luxembourg summit that disturbed us the most is that certain Central and Eastern
European countries that are behind us economically and that only began taking steps
toward democracy in the last five or six years were given a status ahead of ours.” 114 As a
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result of this rejection many Turks believed, and continue to believe, that the EU’s
decision was unfair and that there is an inherent prejudice towards Turkey due to the fact
that it is a predominantly Muslim country and culturally different than the rest of
Europe. 115 Turkish frustration and the sharp deterioration in Turkish-EU relations caused
the EU to reconsider its decision a few years later and make amends with the Republic. In
1999, their relations were put back on track as the EU officially accepted Turkey as a
candidate member at the Helsinki Summit. Although EU leaders formally recognized
Turkey’s candidacy, they made it clear that accession talks would not begin until Turkey
met the required criteria. 116 The positive response revived Turkey’s hopes for EU
membership and lead to a series of political and economic reforms under the AKP
government.
After its electoral victory in 2002, the AKP government which was a supporter of
democratic change and EU membership fully committed itself to the goal of EU
accession. This moderate, Islamic government, whose Western credentials have
constantly been questioned, turned out to be more determined than any previous political
leader in achieving Turkey’s EU goal. As previously mentioned, AKP leaders passed an
impressive series of reforms, positively altered Turkey’s judicial system, civil-military
relations, and human rights record, and successfully harmonized them with European
norms. AKP also implemented economic reforms with the help of IMF and the finance
minister Kemal Dervis, which strengthened and stabilized Turkish economy. In October
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2005, three years after coming to power, the AKP passed enough reforms that it
persuaded EU leaders to formally begin membership talks with the Turkish Republic. 117
This significantly boosted Turkey’s EU aspirations, as the Turks became closer than ever
before in achieving their goal of joining the most important European bloc. However, as
Turkish enthusiasm and efforts grew, EU hesitation also gained momentum.
As the Turks became more willing to meet EU criteria, Europeans grew more
skeptical about allowing a Muslim country to join. Resistance from certain EU member
states and their constituencies has revealed this growing opposition towards Turkey’s EU
membership. Eurobarometers show that the percentage of EU citizens that oppose
Turkish membership has risen steadily over the past few years, and since 2005 it has
exceeded 50%. In France, Germany, and Austria, more than three-quarters of the
population expressed opposition towards Turkish accession. 118 European political leaders
have also shown hostility towards Turkey’s bid to join the European Union. Both
President Nicolas Sarkozy of France and German Chancellor Angela Merkel have
advocated a ‘privileged partnership’ for Turkey instead of full membership. 119 Sarkozy
has outwardly refused to consider Turkey a European country on the grounds that Turkey
is geographically not in Europe and that although Turkey is a “great civilization culture,
it is not a European one.” 120 The main argument against membership stems from
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Turkey’s religious and cultural differences from the rest of Europe. Although Turkey is a
secular pro-Western country, most Europeans cannot ignore the fact that 99.8% of its
population is Muslim. 121 Many European conservatives and nationalists feel that Turkey
would dilute their European identity. 122 Also, given the rise xenophobia and
islamophobia in Europe, many Europeans simply do not want more Muslims to reside in
their country. The rising tide of islamophobia in Europe is evident in the emergence of
far-right parties which have gained increasing power and influence in several European
countries.
The EU’s struggle in integrating its vast Muslim minority population, the current
backlash against Islam and multiculturalism in the aftermath of 9/11 and the Madrid and
London bombings, urban riots in France, and petty crimes involving Muslims, have
fueled Islamophobia throughout Europe and further complicated Turkish-EU relations. 123
European are now much more cautious about allowing Muslim immigrants to enter their
country. Knowing that EU membership for Turkey has the potential to cause a wave of
Turkish immigrants makes many Europeans fear its entry, especially countries such as
Germany which already have a huge Turkish and Kurdish population. There are currently
3.8 million Turks who live in European Union countries, of whom 1.3 million are
citizens. The majority reside in Germany (2.6 million) and France (370,000). 124 It is not a
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coincidence that these are the two nations whose political leaders have vehemently
opposed Turkey’s EU membership. This rejection based on Turkey’s Islamic character
has not gone unnoticed among Turks who feel now, more than ever, that European fears
of and prejudices against Muslims is the underlying reason for their exclusion from the
EU. 125 This conclusion is in fact not too far from the truth. Now that Turkey has more or
less met the economic and political requirements of the EU criteria, the cultural and
religious argument against Turkey has proved to be much more important.
The traditional argument that Turkey is too poor to be let in to the EU no longer
applies. As the Turkish President, Abdulla Gul states: “Turkey used to be known as the
sick man of Europe, whereas Turkey now is the only healthy man of Europe.” 126 This
label of Turkey being the “sick man of Europe” dates back to the Ottoman Empire and
has been continuously used by European politicians to refer to its stagnant economy
throughout much of the Republic’s existence. Today while the euro zone is in deep crisis
and the economies of Greece, Portugal, Spain and Ireland are experiencing economic
meltdowns, the Turkish economy booms. Currently Turkey is ranked by the CIA World
Factbook as having the 17th highest GDP in the world, 127 and it is predicted by some to
become the world’s tenth biggest economy by 2050. 128 According to data obtained from
the World Bank, Turkey’s GDP (constant 2000 US dollar) increased from about $251
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billion in 2001 to approximately $357 billion in 2009, growing at an average annual rate
of 5.3% in those eight years. In 2010, Turkey’s economy grew much faster than those of
European Union member states. Turkey’s growth rate in 2010 was reported to be an
exceptional 7.3% and Turkey was ranked 16th compared to the rest of the world, 129 while
the EU growth was only 1.8%, and it was ranked 160th. 130 Furthermore, some forecasts
suggest that in the next ten years, Turkey’s economy will grow faster than any country
with the exception of India and China. 131 Turkey’s exceptional transformation and
positive economic forecast is a reflection of the AKP government’s impressive array of
economic reforms.
In addition to the economic reforms, AKP has also remained committed to
implementing political changes as well. As previously mentioned the government
recently held a constitutional referendum and passed a democratic reform package which
incorporated EU standards and significantly limited the military’s power. Ever since
Turkey first sought formal membership in 1987, the EU continuously pressed Turkey to
amend its constitution in order to meet the political criteria for EU membership. Under
the AKP government these democratic reforms were finally carried out. However, this
referendum seems to have had very little impact on Turkey’s EU accession process. In
fact Turkey’s membership talks have currently reached a deadlock. Out of the 35
chapters that the EU talks are divided into, 18 of them have been blocked by the EU as
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whole. 132 Five chapters are blocked by France, three by Austria and Germany, and six by
Cyprus. 133 Cyprus, in fact is now considered to be the “biggest single obstacle to
Turkey’s EU hopes.” 134
In order to understand why Cyprus constitutes the main obstacle to Turkey’s EU
accession, a brief historical background on the Cyprus issue is essential. The island of
Cyprus whose population includes both Greek and Turkish Cypriots (respectively 80%
and 20%) gained its independence from Britain in 1960. Less than four years after its
self-determination, violent disputes broke out between the two communities over the
functioning of the government. By 1964, Turkish Cypriots were driven into enclaves by
the majority Greek population. The disputes eventually caused both Greece and Turkey
to intervene. In July 1974, Athens sponsored a coup and overthrew the Greek-Cypriot
leader, Archbishop Makarios, in order to seize power. In response to the coup, Turkey
invaded northern Cyprus that same month in order to protect the Turkish-Cypriots. The
Turks took control of more than one third of the island and drove out and killed Greek
Cypriots. In 1983 Turkish-controlled northern part of the island declared itself the
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus; however its independence was only recognized by
Turkey. Since 1974 the island has remained divided despite several rounds of UNsponsored talks. The most serious effort at settling the dispute came in 2004, just before
Cyprus’ formal entry into the EU. The UN-sponsored plan, known as the Annan Plan,
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proposed a solution for the unification of the island. Since the EU had promised the
Greek-Cypriots membership before the plan was introduced, they saw no need for its
acceptance. On April 2004, while 65% of Turkish-Cypriots voted in favor, an
overwhelmingly high number of Greek-Cypriots: 76%, voted against the unification plan.
A week later only the Greek-Cypriot controlled Cyprus was let into the EU. 135 This
highly upset the AKP government, which was the main supporter of the Annan Plan.
AKP leaders took an enormous political risk by overturning 40 years of Turkish
hostility towards Cyprus and by pressing the Turkish-Cypriots to accept the compromise.
Thus, the rejection did not sit well with the Turks, in fact it further fueled hostility
towards the Greek-Cypriots, who were now a member of the EU and had a powerful veto
that they could use against Turkey. The fact that the EU initially claimed that any side
that rejected the plan would face negative consequences, but instead rewarded the Greek
Cypriots and allowed them to join the EU, angered the Turks and the Turkish Cypriots.
As Philip Gordon and Omer Taspinar mention, “the Turkish Cypriots still suffer from
international isolation while the Greek Cypriots now try to use Cyprus's membership in
the EU to extract concessions from Turkey and to continue to isolate northern
Cyprus.” 136 Since Cyprus has become an EU member, Turkey’s chances of joining the
EU have further diminished.
Today Turkey’s EU membership remains hostage to the Cyprus issue. The GreekCypriots have repeatedly used their veto to block several EU negotiation chapters. Many
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other EU member states have also used the Cyprus dispute against Turkey and have
stated that unless Turkey normalizes its relations with Cyprus, it would not be allowed to
join the EU. 137 Turkey however feels that it made enough of an effort in 2004 and that
the EU should focus instead on pressuring Cyprus to make concessions. AKP leaders are
growing increasingly frustrated with the Cyprus issue and once again feel that Turkey is
victim of an EU double standard. 138 The EU had originally promised that it would end
the economic isolation of Northern Cyprus and allow direct trade between EU countries
and Turkish Cypriots; however it has repeatedly failed to deliver on this promise. Even
though the EU is not holding up its end of the bargain, it is now demanding Turkey to
open its ports and airports to the Greek-Cypriot, before chapters can be unblocked.
Turkey however refuses to do so unless the EU eases the economic isolation of the
north. 139 With Cyprus in the EU, and many member states siding with the GreekCypriots, Turkey’s chances of joining the EU are dwindling. Unless the Cyprus problem
is resolved sometime soon, which is highly unlikely, Turkey’s membership negotiation
will fail to advance.
Turkey’s EU future does not look promising and Turks are becoming increasingly
aware of it. The constant rejection by EU member states such as France, Germany, and
Cyprus, and the lack of progress made in EU negotiations has certainly had a negative
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effect on Turkish public opinion toward EU membership. According to a recent poll by
the Italian Foundation Compagnia di San Paolo and the German Marshall Fund of the
United States, since 2004 support for joining the EU has dropped dramatically. In 2004,
73% of Turks said EU membership would be "a good thing." In 2010 only 38% agreed
with the statement. 140 AKP leaders have also expressed their frustration over the EU bid.
AKP leaders, including President Abdullah Gul have stated that they feel the EU has
deliberately put up hurdles to block Turkey’s chances of becoming a member. Just
recently President Gul said: "It's clear that obstacles have been placed in front of us, but
the world does not stop at the European Union." 141 Prime Minister Erdogan also made a
similar statement at a recent news conference in Bulgaria: "Turkey is constantly being
held up and various hurdles are being put in our path. This is not right." "Some
hindrances are being applied for Turkey which were not applied for any other EU
candidate," he also added. 142 Furthermore, there has been very little enthusiasm for
Germany and France’s suggestion of establishing a “privileged partnership” instead of
full membership. "Such a thing as privileged partnership does not exist…at times I feel
insulted for being offered something which does not exist," said Egemen Bagis, Turkey's
Europeans Affairs Minister. 143 The Turkish people and AKP officials are getting fed up
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with the constant EU rejection and their patience is wearing thin. They feel that no matter
what Turkey does, certain EU member states will find a way to crush its EU dream.
No one can deny the Turks’ disillusionment with Europe. However despite this
frustration, it would be incorrect to infer that Turkey will actually abandon its relations
with the EU. AKP leaders still consider EU membership a top foreign policy priority and
are aware of the economic and political benefits it will have for Turkey in the future.
After acknowledging that the accession process has become very difficult, Ahmet
Davutoğlu, Turkey’s foreign minister assured Europeans that EU membership is still
Ankara’s "first and most strategic objective." 144 Furthermore, Turkey’s EU accession
process has been a powerful catalyst for reform in Turkey. Although AKP leaders should
be credited for carrying out the political and economic reforms that have now
transformed Turkey into a strong and stable nation, the EU’s influence in fueling these
changes must not be forgotten. As stated in a recent article in The Economist, “…the EU
has been the catalyst for an entire programme of social and economic reforms [in
Turkey]. Even before membership talks began in October 2005, the EU was able to
persuade Turkey to adopt a wide-ranging liberal, free-market and democratic agenda.” 145
AKP leaders have especially benefited from EU’s influence. Due to EU demands, the
AKP government has been able to alter the constitution and diminish the power of its
biggest opponent: the Kemalist military. Although the EU’s influence is not as strong as
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it used to be, Turkey is not likely to abandon its EU relations because it greatly benefits
from it especially economically. Turkey is economically anchored in the West as it
receives nearly half of its trade and investment from European nations.
The EU and Turkey enjoy strong economic relations, and Turkey has significantly
benefited from it. The European Custom Agreement, the EC-Turkey trade agreement
signed in 1995, has been one of the main contributing factors to Turkey’s growing
economic prosperity. 146 The Customs Union Agreement gave Turkey access to the EU’s
single market, allowing Turkey to take advantage of free trade. Since this agreement
Turkey has become a much more liberal economy and its overall level of trade openness
(exports+imports/GDP) has significantly increased. According to data based on Penn
World Table, Turkey’s openness increased from 43% in 1995 to 67% in 2007.
Furthermore the European Union is currently Turkey’s top trading partner; in 2009 more
than 40% of its trade was with the European Union. Not only is the EU Turkey’s main
trade partner but it is also its biggest foreign investor. In 2009, foreign direct investment
net inflow to Turkey was more than $8.2 billion, 60% of which came from European
Union member countries. The Netherlands topped the list with $738 million, followed by
France with $616 million. Turkey’s economy is highly dependent on the EU both in
terms of its foreign capital inflows and trade. Thus in order to continue its economic
growth, it is important for Turkey to do what it can to pursue EU membership and
maintain good relations with Europe.
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It is important to mention that as much as Turkey needs the EU to complete its
Western alliance and continue attracting business, the EU also needs Turkey. Turkey’s
impressive economic growth and stability combined with its growing regional importance
have made it a more valuable strategic partner for the EU. Turkey is now an important
actor in the Middle East where the EU’s influence is rather weak. It has established good
relations with countries like Syria and Iran as well as other Muslim countries. It is also
increasingly involved in the Balkans and the Caucus, areas which are of strategic
importance to the EU. David Lidington, the UK Minister for Europe, who has vocally
supported Turkish membership in to the EU, has argued that Turkey has the potential to
increase the EU’s global stance. According to Lidington, “Turkey’s regional influence is
considerable, for instance in the Balkans it has far greater leverage than many individual
EU countries, and its position at the intersection of three areas of strategic importance,
the Middle East, the Balkans and the Caucasus, would contribute significantly to the
European Union’s growing security capabilities.” 147 It is very likely that Turkey’s rising
global influence will gain the Republic more support from EU member states who are
looking to enhance and strengthen EU’s power.
Turkey and the United States
As afore mentioned, it was during the Cold War era that Turkey and the United
States solidified their relationship and became strategic allies. What brought Ankara and
Washington together was the common interest in the containment of Soviet power. The
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fact that Turkey was in a critical front and shared a border with the rising Soviet Union
caused Washington to reach out to Ankara and embrace the Republic in its first NATO
enlargement. The alliance was strategically important for both sides. From Ankara’s
perspective, NATO membership meant protection from the immediacy of the Soviet
threat as well as consolidation of Turkey’s Western credentials. 148 Turkey provided
Washington with a strong army and allowed the United States regular access to its
military bases. In return, the United States brought Turkey under its security umbrella
and secured its position in the West. Although both the U.S. and Turkey significantly
benefited from this relationship, at times Turkey noticed that the two nations were not
equal partners and that the United States gave little consideration to Turkish interests.
This became evident in the 1960s and more so in the recent decades, particularly after the
First and Second Gulf War. After repeatedly finding its interests in conflict with that of
the United States, Turkey has come to the realization that in order to protect its interests it
has to pursue a more independent foreign policy.
Although NATO membership provided vital protection against the Soviet threat,
over the next two decades Turkey began to reconsider the extent of its U.S. commitment
as a series of events unfolded and new factors entered the Turkish calculus. The main
events that negatively impacted Turkey-U.S. relations at the time were the 1962 Cuban
missile crises and the 1964 and 1974 Cyprus crises. 149 During the Cuban missile crisis,
the United States withdrew its Jupiter missiles from Turkey in return for a Soviet
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withdrawal of missiles from Cuba. The U.S. showed very little concern for Turkish
interests and removed the missiles without any consultation with Ankara. This move
shocked Ankara as it revealed for the first time the United States willingness to override
Turkish national interest in order to meet its own. 150 Following this event was the 1964
Cyprus issue which caused Turkey to further doubt the reliability of its alliance with the
United States.
Following the fighting between the Greek and Turkish communities in Cyprus,
the Greek-Cypriot President Makarios amended the constitution that was under the joint
guarantee of Turkey, Greece, and Britain, despite strong opposition from the TurkishCypriots and Ankara. 151 Soon after this incident, U.S. President Johnson sent a letter to
Turkey, which stated the Administration’s disapproval of possible Turkish involvement
and also warned the government that it could not count on NATO support in the event of
a conflict with Greece or even with the Soviet Union. This incident provoked serious
reconsideration in Ankara about the value and nature of its alliance with the United States
and NATO. Some even considered withdrawing from NATO. The lack of support for the
Turkish position on Cyprus particulary from the United States, which was supposed to be
Turkey’s main ally, revealed the need for diversity in Turkey’s foreign policy. This
caused Ankara to focus on improving its relations with other nations, especially the
Soviet Union. Although Turkey did not withdraw from NATO or allow its relations with
the U.S. to fully deteriorate, this was nonetheless the end of Ankara’s “near-total pro-U.S.
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orientation.” In 1974 the Cyprus issue once again caused much tension between Ankara
and Washington. After the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974, the United States banned
all military sales and aid to Turkey for three years. 152 The 1964 and 1974 Cyprus crises
were clearly low points in Turkish-American relations. During both crises, Greece,
Turkey’s most serious European rival, was treated better, due in part to Greek-American
domestic considerations. 153 Furthermore, in both instances Turkey’s NATO membership
and U.S. alliance proved unreliable in helping Turkey pursue its foreign policy
objectives.
After the fall of the Soviet Union, another major event that negatively impacted
Turkey’s perception of U.S. foreign policy was the First Gulf War. Although initially
under Özal’s government Turkey fully backed U.S. efforts in the region, its aftermath left
a legacy of resentment towards U.S. policy. 154 Turkey paid a high price for its U.S.
partnership in the 1991 Gulf War. The war created a Kurdish refugee crisis and also
caused Turkey billions of dollars. As part of U.S. sanctions on Iraq, Turkey cut off its
economic ties including the flow of oil exports from Iraq though its pipelines. For
pipeline fees alone, Turkey lost more than $35 billion in addition to loss of revenue from
trade. In addition to its economic losses, Turkey was also faced with a Kurdish refugee
problem, as more than 450,000 Kurds fled Iraq and sought refuge in Turkey. This was a
direct result of America’s encouragement and support of the Kurdish rebellion against
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Saddam Hussein, which were then crushed by Iraqi forces. 155 After the refugee crisis the
United States helped establish a “no-fly zone” in the north of Iraq in order to protect the
Iraq Kurds. This launched the development of a de facto Kurdish entity in northern
Iraq, 156 and caused much resentment in Ankara. Due to the Gulf War and U.S. efforts, the
Iraqi Kurds now enjoyed a relatively autonomous area. Turkey found this gravely
threatening because it feared that an independent Kurdish state would encourage
Turkey’s Kurds to also fight for secession. Also in the 80s and 90s, the Kurdish problem
was escalating within its own borders and Turkish military forces were in constant battle
with the Kurdish insurgent group, the PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party), which was
demanding separation from Turkey. 157 The threat of Kurdish separatism in Turkey, the
Turkish military’s fight against the PKK, and Ankara’s overall fear of Kurdish
nationalism caused suspicion towards U.S. policy and its intentions vis-à-vis the Kurds.
Many Turks feared that by supporting the Kurds, Washington’s ultimate goal was to
destabilize Iraq and gain influence in the region. 158 The U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003
further intensified this suspicion.
Given that the United States had successfully overthrown Saddam’s government,
there was greater potential for the creation of an independent Kurdish state, which for
Turkey meant the possible break-up of the Republic. Witnessing the gains made by Iraqi
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Kurds towards autonomy during the 1991 Gulf War, this idea did not seem unlikely.
Turkey opposed the United States’ war in Iraq from the start. This became evident in
March 2003, when Turkey refused to allow U.S. troops to transit Turkey on their way to
invade Iraq. This unwillingness to allow the United States access to Turkish bases and its
outright objection to the war severely impacted U.S.-Turkish relations. Given that during
the 1991 Gulf War, Turkey deployed 100,000 troops along its border with Iraq, and
allowed the U.S. to use its Turkish bases, 159 its reaction against the Iraq War was
shocking to the United States. However, after the negative impact the Gulf War had on
Turkey, its response is not unreasonable. Also the Gulf War was an eye-opening
experience for Turkey as it came to the realization that U.S. policy in the region might
undermine its own interests. Ankara’s main concern was with northern Iraq, it wanted to
keep the Kurds from gaining independence and the PKK from establishing safe havens in
the region. The United States however, was concerned about overthrowing Saddam
Hussein and strengthening its own position by gaining the support of the minority Kurds
who would help weaken the centralized character of Saddam’s regime. Realizing the lack
of common interest in regards to the Kurds, Turkey gradually distanced itself from U.S.
foreign policy in Iraq.
The AKP government’s disapproval of the War in Iraq was not because of its
Islamic character and inherent hostility toward the West, but rather it was a strategic
response, one based on its past experiences and current interests. Furthermore, a secular
Kemalist party might have been more likely to oppose the war given the Kemalists’
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distrust of Kurdish nationalism. It has been the nationalists and the army that have
historically been the main suppressors of Kurdish rights. The AKP has actually tried
harder than any previous government in normalizing its relations with the Kurds. 160 Also,
a poll in 2003 revealed that the AKP government held more moderate views towards the
U.S. than the right-wing National Movements Party, which is a nationalist party, and the
left-of-center Republican Peoples Party, the main political representative of Kemalism. 161
Thus, the disapproval of U.S. actions is not unique to the AKP government. In fact many
Turks opposed the war in Iraq and were highly supportive of AKP’s response. This does
not however take away from the fact that Turkey’s vote against allowing the U.S. to use
its territory to invade Iraq shocked Washington and severely damaged their bilateral
relations.
Washington’s frustration with AKP’s decision was enormous. The Bush
Administration felt that Turkey should have helped its traditional strategic ally despite its
concerns over the Iraqi Kurds. In the aftermath of the War, some even blamed Turkey the
Iraqi insurgency on Turkey’s refusal to allow U.S. troops to enter Turkey from the north.
Three years after the war, Donald Rumsfeld, the U.S. Secretary of Defense stated: ‘had
we been successful in getting the 4th Infantry Division to come in through Turkey in the
north when our forces were coming up from the south out of Kuwait, I believe that a
considerably smaller number of the Baathists and the regime elements would have
escaped. More would have been capture of killed, and as a result, the insurgency would
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have been at a lesser intensity than it is today.’ 162 Relations further deteriorated between
Washington in Ankara in July 2003, when U.S. Special forces detained 11 members of
the Turkish Special Forces on suspicion that they were planning an assassination mission
against a Kurdish politician. The detained Turks were held for 48 hours, and were hooded
and mistreated by the Americans. This caused a wave of nationalist anger, humiliation
and resentment across Turkey. 163 As a result, Turkish-U.S. relations hit an all time low.
Also, Turkish public opinion of America has since dropped dramatically. According to
the Pew Global Attitudes Project, in 2000, 52% of Turks thought highly of America
(about the same percentage as in Spain). By 2007, mainly due to the Iraq War, less than
10% held a favorable view of the U.S. In addition to the Iraq issue, another source of
tension between Ankara and Washington has been U.S. policy towards Iran.
In the recent years while Turkey has strengthened its relations with Iran and taken
a diplomatic route in dealing with its nuclear issue, the U.S. policy towards Iran has
become increasingly more confrontational as it has pushed for further sanctions against
the Islamic Republic. As a result, Turkey has found itself in disagreement with
Washington’s aggressive strategy towards Tehran. This divergence became fully evident
in June 2010, when Turkey, as a member of the UN Security Council in 2009-2010,
voted against the fourth round of sanctions on Iran’s nuclear program. 164 This response
was the source of much controversy in the international community, especially among
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U.S. policy-makers who had been quite confident that Turkey would vote in line with
U.S. policy. Turkish diplomats explained that Turkey’s vote against tougher sanctions on
Iran is not because the AKP government is supportive of a nuclear Iran, but because it
believes that sanctions are not the right solution to the Iranian nuclear issue. In a recent
speech at Columbia University, President Gul was asked to comment on Turkey’s
negative vote. He responded by first reiterating Turkey’s strong stance against nuclear
weapons and stating that Turkey believes that the best way to deal with this issue is
through diplomacy and not confrontation. 165 Turkey believes that sanctions on Iran will
cause more tension between the two nations and lead to greater pressure for war and
further destabilization of the region.
Given that Turkey is Iran’s neighbor, it is very reasonable for the government to
feel particularly concerned about the impact of sanctions. In addition to Turkey’s stability
concerns, another main reason why Turkey is reluctant to fully support U.S. policy
toward Iran is because it would complicate its access to Iranian energy supplies. 166
Turkey is highly dependent on Iran for its energy needs. In 2009, for example, Iran
supplied 1/3 of Turkey’s total natural gas consumption. 167 If Turkey were to fully support
U.S. sanctions on Iran, it would have to pay a high economic price. Turkey learned the
lesson that sanctions are bad for business in the aftermath of the first Gulf War, when it
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cut off the flow of oil from Iraq in 1991 in support of U.S. sanctions against in Iraq and
lost billions of dollars. Turkey is not about to make the same mistake twice, which is why
it avoids supporting sanctions on Iran especially ones that target Iran’s oil and gas
industry.
Despite the recent political tensions between Ankara and Washington, the two
countries have enhanced their economic ties. According to data obtained from the World
Bank, in 2009, bilateral trade between the two amounted to more than $11.8 billion. Due
to this significantly large trade volume in 2009, the United States was ranked as Turkey’s
4th biggest trade partner. 168 In 2009, Prime Minister Erdogan and President Obama met in
Washington, where they launched the Framework for Strategic Economic and
Commercial Cooperation, a new initiative aimed at strengthening trade and investment
ties. Since then, several meetings have been held on this agreement and the two countries
have enhanced their economic and commercial relations. 169 Turkey’s impressive
economic growth in the past decade has made its economy much more attractive to
America, which feels that Turkey is now a globally important economic actor. In 2009,
Turkey attracted $318 million in FDI from the United States, which was its 4th largest
FDI inflow. 170 As well stated in a joint-statement after a meeting on the U.S. - Turkey
Framework for Strategic Economic and Commercial Cooperation:
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“The United States and Turkey each have a strong incentive to pursue an
intensified bilateral economic relationship. Turkey is a fast-rising economic actor in its
region and in the world and many of its firms would like to explore new opportunities in
the U.S. market. American companies in turn see vast commercial potential in a rapidly
developing Turkey of 73 million people, with onward connections to markets in Europe,
the Middle East, Central Asia and beyond.” 171
Although Turkey-U.S. relations have had their ups and downs, the two nations are still strong
strategic partners, both politically and economically. In the eyes of Americans, Turkey used to be
solely known for its military contribution to NATO. That is no longer the case however. Now
Turkey is becoming increasingly known for its independent foreign policy, dynamic economy
and its regional influence.

Turkey and Israel
Not only was Turkey among the first countries to recognize the state of Israel in
1949, but it was also the first Muslim nation to do so. 172 Compared to its Middle Eastern
neighbors, for much of its history, Turkey was known to be Israel’s closest ally in the
region. However, in the past few years as Turkey-Israeli relations have plummeted,
Turkey is no longer considered a close Israeli partner. Relations have deteriorated due to
the Israeli war on Gaza in 2008 and also the recent Gaza Flotilla raid. In order to
understand current Turkey-Israeli relations it is important to examine what initially united
the two nations.
Turkey’s initial good relations with Israel can best be understood when the
military factor and the Cold War context are taken into consideration. During the Cold
171
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War, Turkey was determined to consolidate its place in the Western alliance and gave
little consideration to its relations with Arab states. Furthermore, Israel was an invisible
member of NATO and an important ally of the U.S. Thus, Turkey was not reluctant to
recognize Israel in order to further align its policy with that of the United States. 173 The
Turkish military at the time also pushed for closer ties with Israel. The Kemalist military
elite saw Israel as the perfect ‘anti-Islamic’ symbol and knew that its alliance with Israel
would set Turkey apart from other Muslim countries. 174 For Israel, a good relationship
with Turkey was important because it meant having a strong military ally in a rather
hostile neighborhood. The military alliance between the two nations was in fact the
driving force in Turkey’s growing ties with Israel especially in the 1990s when relations
among the two states peaked.
In 1996, Turkey and Israel signed a military cooperation agreement as they began
joint military training programs. Turkey allowed Israel to establish posts on its soil in
order to spy on Iran, Iraq, and Syria. It also allowed Israel to train its pilots over Turkish
airspace. Israel in return supplied the Turkish Republic with military technology,
including American tanks and warplanes, which the U.S. and EU refused to provide
Turkey with. In the 1990s, Israel’s military relations were particularly useful to Turkey
because it helped Turkey gained leverage in its problematic relations with Syria at the
time. The Israeli connection proved particularly valuable when Turkey launched a new
military modernization project and received tremendous investment from Israel. In
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support of this project, Israel provided Turkey with technology and serious financial
investment. Between 2000 and 2004, Israel sold more than $1 billion worth of arms to
Turkey. 175 In addition to the military alliance, the two countries also cooperated
economically. Turkey and Israel signed a free trade agreement in 2000 which
significantly boosted bilateral trade.176 According to the Turkish Statistical Institute,
between 2000 and 2008 overall trade between Turkey and Israel more than tripled. It
amounted to $3.4 billion in 2008. Despite Turkey and Israel’s military and economic
cooperation, their relationship was never free of tension.
There has always been sympathy for the plight of Palestinians in Turkey and as a
result of this, Turkey-Israeli relations have fluctuated frequently. Their relationship was
first tested during 1967 Arab-Israeli War in which Turkey sided with Egypt and refused
to join the group that demanded the reopening of the Gulf Aqaba to Israel. During the
1973 War, Ankara once again went against Israeli interests and denied the U.S. access to
the American bases in Turkey for the resupply of Israel. 177 Also, in 1980, when Israel
declared Jerusalem as its capital, Turkey protested its declaration and withdrew its
consulate. 178 Although there had always been underlying tension between Israel and
Turkey, relations were relatively stable. It was not until 2008, that Turkey-Israel relations
plummeted. Since Soon 2008, two major events: the War on Gaza, also known as
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Operation Cast Lead, and the Israeli raid on the Gaza-bound Turkish flotilla, caused a
significant rift between Turkey and Israel.
In December 2008, Turkey launched Operation Cast Lead, and began a three
week bombing campaign against Gaza. The war resulted in the death of more than 1300
Palestinians and worsened the humanitarian crisis in Gaza triggering much opposition
from Turkey. Operation Cast Lead proved to be a turning point in Israel-Turkish
relations. Prime Minister Erdoğan’s abrupt walk-out from the Davos Summit after a
heated debate over the War in Gaza was an important representation of Turkish reaction.
During this Summit in January 2009, Erdoğan clashed with the Israeli President Shimon
Peres, as he condemned Israeli actions against Gaza. Before storming off, Erdoğan
directly called out the Israeli President and told him to stop killing innocent children. 179
This revealed how passionately Erdoğan felt for the Palestinians and their sufferings.
Also, Erdoğan’s reaction was a reflection of the views of the Turkish population, who
were angry and shocked by the Israeli’s assault on the Palestinian people. After the attack
on Gaza began there were massive protests and demonstrations throughout Turkey
condemning Israeli actions. Erdoğan himself was personally caught by surprise and felt
betrayed by Israel because just days before the War, Ehud Olmert had visited Turkey and
promised a positive response on talks with Syria. Turkey had been facilitating talks
between Israel and Syria since 2004 and Erdoğan was convinced that he was making
serious progress on brokering peace between the two hostile nations. Erdoğan who felt
that Olmert had made a personal commitment to upholding peace talks was very angry
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and disappointed in how quickly Israel put an end to years of efforts made in brokering
Arab-Israeli peace. 180 Erdoğan’s perception of having been betrayed by his Israeli partner
in addition to the overall aggression of Israel against Palestinians severely impacted
Turkey’s relations with Israel.
The most serious negative development in Turkish-Israeli relations was the June
2010 Israeli attack against an aid flotilla attempting to break the blockade that Israel had
imposed on Gaza. Israeli soldiers stormed the Turkish ship on international waters,
attacking the people on board, injuring hundreds and killing nine. The flotilla was
carrying 700 pro-Palestinian activists and 10,000 tons of aid. Among those on board were
400 Turks who were determined to put an end to the humanitarian crisis in Gaza. 181
Although Israel justified its actions as normal self-defense, Turkey referred to Israeli
actions as ‘state terrorism’ and considered it an act of ‘piracy’ and ‘murder by a state.’ 182
Turkey was not alone in its reaction and condemnation of Israeli actions against the
Gaza-bound aid ship. The deadly raid sparked an international outcry and led to mass
demonstrations throughout the world. In Istanbul more than 10,000 protested around the
Israeli consulate shouting in anger and waving signs saying ‘Killer Israel.’ 183
In its reaction towards the flotilla attack, the AKP government withdrew its
ambassador to Israel and canceled three military exercises that were planned for 2010.
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Furthermore, the government sought international condemnation of Israel through the UN
Security Council, NATO, and the Organization of the Islamic Conference. This increased
the pressure on Israel and led to the UN investigation of the incident. Also, Ankara
demanded the lifting of the blockade and an apology from Israel in addition to
compensation for the families of the victims. 184 The Gaza flotilla attack has caused
Turkey-Israeli relations to hit an all time low. As Israel continues to plead self-defense
and refuses an apology, Turkey is growing more frustrated and is continuously calling on
international action against Israel. Unless Israel tries to normalize its relations with
Turkey and meets the demands of the AKP government, their relationship is not likely to
improve. There is now deep distrust between Turkey and Israel.
In the past several years AKP leaders tried harder than any other previous
government in pushing peace talks between Israel and the Palestinians as well as between
Israel and Syria. Also, the Gaza flotilla attack made Turkey more involved in the ArabIsraeli conflict and strengthened its pro-Palestinian stance. With eight Turks dead as a
result of Israel’s violent raid, Turkey now felt even stronger about the human rights
violations committed by the Israeli government. Had Israel not killed nine people on
board, Turkey-Israeli relations would not have plummeted to this extent. In a sense,
Israeli actions pushed Turkey to take a harder stance on the issue. It is important to
highlight that Turkey is not the only country that condemns Israel for its recent human
rights violations; there are several European countries that agree with Turkey’s stance on
Israel. They might not express their pro-Palestinians views as strongly and vocally as
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Turkey, but they have voiced their opinion by voting in favor of several UN Human
Rights Council resolutions against the Israeli government. Also, as mentioned in The
Economist: “the Turkish government is doing what democracies tend to do: reflecting its
people’s views.” 185 Turks along with other Muslims have always sympathized with the
Palestinian cause and highly criticized Israel’s appalling treatment of Palestinians. Long
before tensions arose between Turkey and Israel, polls revealed that Turks have always
favored the Palestinians over Israel. According to a poll taken in 2004, approximately
two-thirds of Turks favored Turkey siding with the Palestinians while less than 3%
thought Turkey should side with Israel. 186 Also, according to the German Marshall Fund
of the U.S., in 2007, more than 47% of Turks held a favorable view of Palestinians, the
highest percentage compared to any other national group; only 5% thought well of
Israel. 187 Under the AKP government, Ankara’s foreign policy is now more receptive to
public opinion.
In addition to the negative public opinion in Turkey, the tense situation between
the two countries has hurt economic ties as well, particularly trade and tourism.
Economic and civilian relations have plummeted since 2008 and especially after that
Gaza flotilla attack. According to data obtained from the Turkish Statistical Institute,
from 2008 to 2009, overall trade between Turkey and Israel dropped by nearly 30%,
decreasing from $3.4 billion to $2.6 billion. The tension between the two countries has
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also been reflected in tourism. Turkey used to be the second most popular tourism
destination for Israelis, and it was highly promoted in the Israeli media as well. In 2008,
558,183 Israeli citizens visited Turkey. This high number dropped by 44% and decreased
to 311,582 in 2009. The number of Israeli tourists is expected to decrease much further
after the 2010 Gaza flotilla crisis due to the fact that the Israeli Foreign Minister has
warned Israeli citizens to avoid travel to Turkey and encouraged them to boycott the
country. Consequently, in 2010, more than 130,000 Israeli tourists cancelled their trip to
Turkey. 188 Thus, in addition to military and diplomatic ties being broken, economic and
civilian ties have also suffered.
Since Operation Cast Lead and the Israeli raid on the Turkish Freedom Flotilla,
Israeli and Turkish relations have significantly deteriorated. It takes years to establish
good relations and minutes to break them. In the aftermath of the Israeli military raid on
the flotilla, Abdullah Gul announced in a televised speech: "from now on, Turkish-Israeli
ties will never be the same. This incident has left an irreparable and deep scar." 189
Despite the immense tension on both sides, it is unlikely that the Turkish government will
completely freeze all ties with Israel, because the costs of doing so would be very high.
At a time when Western diplomats and policy makers doubt Turkey’s Western credential
and commitments, AKP leaders are likely to avoid completely cutting ties with Israel.
However, at the same time, it is highly unlike that relations will improve in the near
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future. In addition to the increasingly hostility towards Turkey, there is also a diminished
need for an Israeli alliance in Ankara. Now that Turkey has excellent relations with the
Muslim world and particularly with Syria, a military alliance with Israel is no longer a
valuable asset. The days when Turkey looked towards Israel for alliance against the Arab
world are over.
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CHAPTER 4- Turkey’s Relations with the East
Turkey’s New Foreign Policy
The purpose of this chapter is to examine Turkey’s new foreign policy objectives
under the AKP government and to discuss the underlying reasons for Ankara’s new
found interest in the greater Middle East. Particular focus will be given to Turkey’s
relations with Iraq, Iran, and Syria, with whom Turkey shares borders.
Since the end of the Cold War and most recently with the AKP government in
power, Turkish foreign policy has undergone a profound and unprecedented
transformation. Turkey no longer takes a passive and one-dimensional stance but rather
pursues a more dynamic and multi-dimensional foreign policy. Furthermore, its
international priorities have shifted from hard security concerns to soft power and
commercial interests. AKP leaders, Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan, President Abdullah
Gul, and Turkey’s new foreign minister Ahmet Davutoğlu, can be credited for Turkey’s
new regional influence and assertive foreign policy in the Middle East. Ahmet Davutoğlu
in particular, has become known as the “architect” and the main driver of Turkey’s active
and diversified foreign policy under the AKP. 190
Ahmet Davutoğlu was appointed as Turkey’s Foreign Minister in 2009, after
being the chief foreign policy advisor of Prime Minister Erdoğan for seven years. 191
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Under Davutoğlu’s leadership, Turkey now adheres to the concept of “strategic depth,”
which includes the pursuit of an active and diversified foreign policy both in the in the
world and in the former Ottoman region. After all, the Ottoman Empire at its height in
the 17th century was a large and powerful empire. It stretched across three continents and
encompassed most of the Middle East, North Africa, and parts of Eastern Europe, where
it extended its culture and influence and left and enduring legacy. Davutoğlu’s ‘strategic
depth’ doctrine calls for a new policy of engagement with the region. Davutoğlu believes
that Turkey should take advantage of the legacy of the Ottoman Empire and use its
geographical and historical depth to assert its power and interest in the world. 192 He
argues that Turkey has neglected its regional interests, particularly in the Middle East,
due to its unbalanced foreign policy and overemphasis on ties with the West.
Furthermore, Davutoğlu has based Turkey’s foreign policy on the principle of ‘zero
problems with the neighbors,’ and has made the effort to put an end to past hostilities
among Turkey and its neighbors. 193 Moreover, he has incorporated a new diplomatic
style in Turkish foreign policy, which has resulted in the spread of Turkish soft powerpolitical, economic, diplomatic, and cultural influence- in the form Ottoman region. In
the past decade, due to the adoption of a new engagement policy, Turkish foreign policy
has become truly multifaceted. Turkey no longer ignores its backyard and has made the
deliberate effort to improve its economic and political ties with its Middle Eastern
neighbors.
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Turkey and Iraq
After losing World War I, the British gained control of what is now contemporary
Iraq, which used to be part of the Ottoman Empire. In the British mandate of Iraq, Mosul
and Kirkuk, the two former Ottoman provinces with the highest population of Kurds,
were also included. Although initially Ataturk demanded the return of these provinces,
however, once confronted with the difficulty of assimilating the Kurds in the Turkish
eastern region, he abandoned the idea. Ataturk and the other Kemalist founding fathers
however remained suspicious of Western imperialist ambitions to carve up a Kurdish
state (which would include Turkey’s eastern region) and break up the new Republic. 194
With no natural borders between the Kurdish region of Iraq and Turkey, this suspicion
grew. In 1926, after eight years of intense pressure from Ankara, the Brits finally drew up
a border, and Ataturk gave up his claim on the Kurdish provinces. 195 With the borders
finally drawn, Ataturk channeled his attention towards his domestic Westernization
efforts and “eschewed any foreign policy adventures with irredentist or Ottomanist
undertones.” 196

One of the few times that Ankara did involve itself in regional efforts was in the
late 1930s. In 1937, Turkey signed the Saadabad Pact with Iraq, Iran, and Afghanistan.
The Saadabad Pact was a non-aggression pact where the four countries agreed to
recognize and respect each other’s territorial integrity and to cooperate on suppressing
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rebellious movements and ethnic demands within their borders. Although the Kurds were
not specifically mentioned, it was indirectly implied. In fact, the Kurdish issue was the
main reason why Ankara signed the pact. With the end of World War I, the Kurds who
previously lived within the boundaries of the former Ottoman Empire were divided
between Turkey and the new British and French mandates of Iraq and Syria. Iran also had
a large Kurdish population. Thus for Iraq, Turkey, and Iran, the Kurdish issue played a
major role in the creation of the pact, because for them it meant the containment of
Kurdish insurgencies and the crushing of the Kurdish demand for autonomy. 197
The early Cold War period, once again brought Turkey and Iraq together as the
two nations signed a second pact known as the Baghdad Pact . However, this time the
alliance was short-lived. The Baghdad Pact, signed in 1955, as afore mentioned, was
aimed at containing the growth of Soviet influence in the region. This pact placed both
Turkey and Iraq in the Western camp and strengthened their cooperation. This mutual
cooperation however came to an abrupt end in1958, after the British-sponsored monarchy
in Iraq was overthrown. The new leadership that came to power in Iraq promptly
withdrew from the pro-Western pact and instead joined the Arab nationalist camp that
largely looked towards the Soviet Union for support. 198 Tensions between Iraq and
Turkey arose shortly thereafter. In reaction to Iraq’s foreign policy shift, Turkey even
proposed a Western military intervention in Iraq, which other members of the pact and
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the United States strongly disagreed with. 199 Iraq’s abandonment of the pact further
fueled Turkish hostility towards the Arab world and caused a rift between the two
nations. For the next several decades, Turkey-Iraq relations remained tense and limited,
as Turkey ignored Iraq along with other Arab nations in the region.
The oil crises of 1970s however, caused Turkey to reach out to Iraq.200 In order to
assure its oil supply, Turkey pushed for stronger economic relations with Iraq. The
countries soon began to establish the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline which opened up in 1977.
This pipeline carried approximately a quarter of Iraqi crude oil exports into Turkey. 201
Turkey maintained its relatively cordial ties with Iraq until the late 1980s. In 1991
however, with the breakout of the Gulf War, Turkey, in support of U.S. policy and in line
with its Western orientation, broke off all ties with Iraq. The 1991, Gulf War was a
watershed event in Turkey-Iraq relations. As mentioned in the previous chapter, Ankara
cut off all ties with Baghdad. It enforced UN sanctions which called for the closing of the
1977 Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline and deployed thousands of troops on its shared border with
Iraq. The aftermath of the 1991 Gulf War was a disaster for Turkey. Not only did Turkey
lose one of its top economic partners along with billions of dollars, it also now faced a
serious security problem.
After the 1991 Gulf War, the Kurdish issue became an important security threat
for Ankara. The War caused thousands of Kurdish refugees to flee into Turkey at a time
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when Turkey was battling against its own Kurdish population at home. From early 1980s
onward, there was an ongoing armed conflict between Turkey and various Kurdish
insurgent groups such as the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), which called for the
creation of an independent Kurdish nation. Now that thousands of Iraqi Kurdish refugees
had flooded in to Turkey and the Kurdish question was gaining international intention,
Turkey grew insecure as its old fear of the possible break of the Republic resurfaced.
What further fueled this fear was the fact that the Iraqi Kurdish region in northern Iraq
was now under U.S. and UN protection and was quickly developing into an autonomous
Kurdish zone. By the mid-1990s it was very much an independent de facto state, in all
but name. 202 Also, another factor added to Turkey’s insecurity. Iraqi Kurdish insurgent
groups gained strengthen and the PKK found a logistical base in northern Iraq. 203
Consequently, in the years that followed the Kurdish issue dominated Turkey’s foreign
policy towards the region. Starting in the mid-1990s, Turkey launched dozens of
operations in northern Iraq with the aim of destroying PKK sanctuaries. These operations
did gradually lead to the containment of the PKK military threat and somewhat eased
Turkey’s Kurdish fear. 204 Also, at the time Ankara knew that it could count on Saddam
Hussein to silence Kurdish demands and maintain stability in the region. 205 Turkey’s
sense of stability in the Kurdish region was short lived however. In March 2003, despite
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strong opposition from Ankara, the United States invaded Iraq and overthrew Saddam’s
regime.
As Iraq slipped into chaos after the U.S. invasion, Turkey’s fear of Kurdish
separatism reemerged and northern Iraq once again topped Turkey’s security agenda. 206
Also, the PKK, which Turkey had believed was successfully dissolved, resurfaced and
took up arms again. Since 2005, the PKK has repeatedly launched attacks on Turkish
territory and has killed hundreds of Turkish troops. These attacks were once again
organized and launched from sanctuaries in northern Iraq. 207 The threats that Turkey had
fought off for decades had now reemerged and seemed stronger than ever. In addition to
Iraq becoming a breeding ground for terrorism and ethnic separatism, Kurdish autonomy
was also gaining serious momentum in Iraq. The reemergence of the PKK coupled with
the reality of Kurdish autonomy, compelled Ankara to get involved. The AKP
government had two ways in which it could respond to the situation in Iraq: it could
either stick to the traditional Kemalist approach of refusing dialogue with Kurds, or it
could pursue a more flexible and pragmatic approach. The AKP leaders chose the
latter. 208 It is possible that if the Kemalist leaders were in power, Turkey would have
launched a military intervention in northern Iraq against the rising Kurdish threat. The
AKP government however, has distanced itself from the confrontational approach and
has relied on dialogue instead. In 2007, Abdullah Gul, who was then the Foreign Minister
of Turkey, initiated dialogue with Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and invited its
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Prime Minister to visit Ankara. However, he was soon forced to cancel the event after the
chief of the Turkish general staff publically announced his opposition to dialogue with
the Iraqi Kurdish leader. 209 Despite opposition from military and secular elite, AKP
leaders gradually began to establish diplomatic relations with the Kurdish government in
northern Iraq.
In 2007, with help from Washington, dialogue officially began with Turkey and
the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). 210 Since then, bilateral relations between
Turkey and northern Iraq have reached unprecedented heights. Turkey now has four
diplomatic posts in Iraq, one of which is located in Erbil, the KRG capital. Also, the KRG
just recently agreed to assist Turkey in curtailing the PKK. 211 In line with its new “zeroproblem with neighbors” foreign policy and new independent role, AKP leaders have
taken a diplomatic approach in dealing with the historical Kurdish issue. In addition to
the Kurdish nationalism and separatism issue, there are also other important factors such
as economic interest and the new geopolitical environment that have that have
contributed to Turkey’s growing ties with not just northern Iraq but the country as a
whole.
Growing economic relations between Turkey and Iraq have significantly
strengthened their new relationship. The fall of Saddam’s regime gave Ankara the
opportunity to reestablish the economic ties that had previously existed between Turkey
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and Iraq prior to the 1991 Gulf War. The AKP, as part of its growing economic interest in
the region, seized this opportunity and began to establish trade and business relations
with Iraq. Since 2003, trade relations between Turkey and Iraq have reached a record
high. In 2009, total trade between the two countries amounted to more than $6 billion,
almost six times the amount it was in 2003. 212 In addition to trade relations, Turkey has
also increased investment in Iraq, especially in the Kurdish region. Currently more than
700 Turkish companies are investing in Iraq. These Turkish firms have carried out dozens
of construction projects. They have built houses, bridges, highways, railroads, and
schools throughout Iraq. 213 Turkish companies have also built most of the modern
symbols representing northern Iraq’s Kurdish identity, such as TV networks, universities
and international airports. A Turkish company has even built a ‘presidential palace’ in
Erbil for the Kurdish government. 214 These growing business relations between Turkey
and Iraq have eased historical tensions among the two countries. Both sides have found
their new friendship economically beneficial. Iraq’s economy is benefiting from Turkey’s
trade, investment and infrastructure projects, and Turkey is benefiting from both Iraqi
trade and also access to oil. It has been able to diversify its energy needs by directly
importing oil from northern Iraq. 215 While meeting its economic interests Turkey has also
been able to increase its influence in the region.
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By asserting its economic power in Iraq, Turkey has successfully boosted its
stature as an influential regional actor. Unlike the United States which focused on the
number of troops it would send to Iraq, Turkey focused instead on the number of
infrastructure projects it would initiate. Turkey’s efforts in Iraq are considered to have a
more lasting legacy because of the AKP’s focus on soft power: the assertion of influence
through diplomacy and economic reconstruction and development. 216 Also, the United
States’ policy failure and its overall conduct and inability to stabilize Iraq, created a
vacuum of leadership in the region. This vacuum in fact gave Turkey the perfect
opportunity to step in and exert its power and pursue its interests in northern Iraq. 217
Turkey’s new approach towards Kurdish Iraq has been received well by Kurdish
officials. Turkey’s acceptance of KRG and its dedication to economic development in
Iraq, especially in the northern region, has helped Turkey project a positive image to the
Iraqi Kurds, who no longer feel threatened by Ankara. 218
Turkey and Iran
Turkey and Iran have always been historical rivals. In the past much of the rivalry
and tension between them was driven by ideological and religious differences. During the
Ottoman Period, there was a clear Sunni-Shia rift between the two empires. It was always
the Sunni Ottomans versus the Shia Persians. After assuming the title of caliphate, the
Ottoman Sultans saw the Shia Persians as heretics who tried to invade Sunni land.
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Ottomans and Persians also fought major wars during the sixteenth century. 219 By the
seventeenth century however, serious territorial wars between them had come to an end,
and despite their inherent religious differences they managed to coexist in virtual peace
for hundreds of years. The Turks and Persians did not become actual allies until after
World War I however. Relations began to improve between Turkey and Iran during the
Ataturk period and the Pahlavi era in Iran. Ataturk’s secular Western model was admired
by Reza Shah of Iran who was also a staunch secularist and a Western modernizer.
Although Reza Shah was not nearly as successful, he also imposed westernization
reforms similar to that of Ataturk’s in Iran. In addition to admiration for Turkey’s secular
and Western model, what brought the two countries closer was the Cold War.
Turkey and Iran shared a geopolitical concern over the rise of the Soviet threat
and both aligned themselves to the Western camp. 220 However, this alliance came to an
abrupt end in 1979 with the Iranian revolution which transformed the country into an
Islamic Republic. In the 1980s, the historic rivalry between Turkey and Iran reemerged.
This time it was in the context of a secular Turkey versus Shia Iran. When Ayatollah
Khomeini began talks of exporting the Islamic revolution, the Kemalists came to see their
secular political regime as a natural target. Thus, Turkey started to distance itself from
Iran and began to pursue the same non-engagement policy it had towards other Muslim
countries in the region. 221 The strictly Islamic character of the Iranian government
however was not the only source of tension among them. The other issue that rose
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between Turkey and Iran had to do with the Kurdish issue and the PKK. As Turkey
became the target of PKK attacks in the mid-1980s, the military began to accuse Iran of
supporting insurgents and allowing them to use Iranian territory to launch attacks on
Turkey. Iran, on the other hand, accused Turkey of supporting and harboring antirevolutionary forces. 222 By the mid-1990s, as Iran’s Islamic revolution lost steam,
relations between Turkey and Iran gradually improved. Also, by the 1990s, political
Islam was on the rise in Turkey which helped bring Tehran and Ankara closer together.
Erbakan, who was Prime Minister in 1996, visited Tehran and made the effort to enhance
economic and political ties with Iran. 223 Although he was overthrown in the 1997
military coup, he normalized Ankara’s relations with Iran. Once the AKP government
came to power, it was able to build on this relationship and strengthen Turkish-Iranian
relations. Today, Turkey and Iran are close allies with strong diplomatic, economic and
political ties. They have just recently cooperated in joint military efforts against the PKK
and the PJAK (Party for a Free Life), a similar Kurdish organization operating in Iran. 224
It is important however, to distinguish between Erbakan’s intentions and AKP’s foreign
policy vision. Erbakan’s engagement with Iran was driven by his desire to purse panIslamic ideas in the region. AKP leaders however, are not interested in pan-Islamism.
Their aim is for Turkey to have good relations with all its neighbors so that it can become
an important regional actor.
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The AKP leaders adhered to their diplomatic and proactive policy of engagement
and put historical differences aside as they improved Ankara’s relations with Tehran.
Starting with Prime Minister Erdoğan’s two day visit to Tehran in July 2004, there has
been a thawing of relations between the two neighbors. 225 Since the AKP government
came to power, Turkey has deepened its relationship with Iran through growing trade and
bilateral investment. According to data obtained from the Turkish Statistical Institute,
since 2002, trade between Turkey and Iran has increased more than four-fold, reaching
$5.4 billion in 2009. Also just recently, Prime Minister Erdoğan announced that Ankara
is seeking to triple trade volumes with Iran between 2010 and 2015. In a speech to
business leaders in Istanbul who are the main investors in Iran’s state-owned machinery,
automotive and textile industries, Erdoğan ensured them that economic ties between
Ankara and Tehran will continue to grow and that the two countries are near signing a
‘preferential trade agreement’ that could add billions of more dollars to Turkey’s growing
economy. 226 Iran has become an attractive export market for Turkish businessmen and
the Anatolian Tigers. In 2010, Iran became the 12th biggest importer of Turkish goods,
climbing up from being 17th in 2005. While most Turkish exports are from the
automotive and machinery sectors, Iran’s exports to Turkey are largely from one sector:
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energy. 227 Energy has become a major force behind the warming of relations between
Iran and Turkey.
As previously mentioned, Turkey is highly dependent on Iran for energy. Iran is
its second largest supplier of natural gas. Thus, cooperation in the energy sector is a key
priority for the Turkish Republic. As Turkey’s energy needs have increased, Iran has
actively sought new markets for its most important export, providing further means of
cooperation among them. 228 The two have also engaged in discussion regarding the
construction of new pipelines that would deliver Iranian oil via Turkey to Europe. In
February 2007, Erdoğan signed two new energy deals with Iran: one granting the Turkish
Petroleum Corporation permission to explore oil and gas filed in Iran, and another
allowing the construction of pipeline that passes through Iran and allows the transfer of
gas from Turkmenistan to Turkey and on to Europe. 229 Despite continuous economic
sanctions by the U.S. and the UN to stop global investment in Iran’s energy sector,
Turkey has made it clear that it will not allow sanctions to impair its energy cooperation
with Iran. Many of Erdoğan’s critics view Turkey’s energy deals with Iran as proof that
he is ultimately trying to steer Turkey away from the West. However, AKP leaders argue
that they in fact have the opposite goal: to increase Turkey’s chances of becoming an EU
member by making it a vital energy corridor for the flow of oil and gas between the
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Middle East and Europe. 230 This argument certainly has validity given the fact that
unlike the United States, the European Union has been in favor of Turkish pipeline plans.
231

This is because the European Union imports half of its energy and is in serious need

of diversifying its sources. Around a fifth of EU countries’ oil and gas comes from
Russia’s large Gazprom Company which has a monopoly-like control over EU energy. 232
Turkey through its strong economic ties with Iran has the potential to undermine Russia’s
energy dominance and help both the European Union and its own nation reduce their
strong dependency on Russia.
If Turkey succeeds in bringing Iranian oil and natural gas to Europe, it will further
increase its regional importance, which has been one of its main foreign policy
objectives. Ahmet Davutoğlu, believes that by remaining actively involved in the region
and maintaining good relations with Middle Eastern countries like Iran, Turkey is
becoming more, not less, attractive to Europe and the West. 233 AKP leaders also point out
that no other nation that is a member of the Western alliance has regular access to highlevel Iranian officials, like Turkey does. 234 This high-profile relationship with Iran has
rightly increased Turkey’s sense of self-importance because it has given Turkey
significant bargaining power. Turkey in fact has tried to broker compromise between its
Western allies and Iran. Just this past month, in January 2011, Turkey facilitated nuclear
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talks between Iran and the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, plus
Germany. 235 The fact that Turkey was the host alone demonstrates that Turkey has
successfully established itself as an important and valuable partner both in the eyes of the
West and Iran.
Turkey has chosen a different approach towards Iran, one that contrasts markedly
with U.S. policy. Turkey, similar to its Western partners is against Iran’s development of
nuclear weapons. Iran’s nuclear capability is a serious security concern for Turkey, not
because it fears an attack from Iran, but rather because a nuclear Iran would gravely
threaten stability in the region. Turkey, has however, recognized the right of Iran, as a
party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), to develop nuclear technology for peaceful
means. 236 According to Namik Tan, the Turkish Ambassador to the United States, the
Turkish government believes that engagement is the only path to follow in dealing with
Iran’s nuclear issue. It is in line with this perspective that Turkey initiated the Joint
Declaration with Iran and voted against new sanctions at the UN Security Council. 237
The Joint Declaration signed between Iran, Turkey, and Brazil in May 2010, resumed
dialogue between Iran & the international community. By signing the agreement Iran
reaffirmed its commitment to the NPT and agreed to send 1,200 kilograms of low-
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enriched uranium to Turkey, where it would then be monitored by the IAEA. 238 The AKP
government felt that through its diplomatic efforts it was making progress on the Iranian
nuclear issue. In line with this non-confrontational approach, Turkey (and Brazil)
opposed the UN resolution which called for tougher sanctions on Iran. If it had voted in
favor of the sanctions, Turkey would have completely undermined the deal it had made
with Iran in May. Turkey’s assertiveness regarding Iran is relatively new and the
international community, especially the United States, is not accustomed to seeing
Turkey play such an independent role in Middle Eastern affairs.
Although Turkey and the United States share similar concerns regarding Iran,
AKP leaders prefer to use soft power. As Mustafa Akyol, a Turkish American journalist
states in a recent Foreign Affairs article: “[AKP leaders] have learned that they can gain - both in standing and economically -- by declining to join the United States when it acts
in ways that seem needlessly aggressive.” 239 Although Turkey wants to keep its dialogue
with Iran going, nuclear diplomacy is very complicated and difficult to maintain. It has
already caused tension between the United States and Turkey. It is going to be very
challenging for AKP leaders to maintain good relations with both Iran and the United
States given the years of hostility between Washington and Tehran. However, Turkey is
certainly capable of tackling this challenge especially if it maintains its diplomatic clout.
Furthermore, neither Iran nor the United States have any reason to cut their ties with
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Turkey. The United States still considers Turkey and important ally and is becoming
increasingly aware of it strategic importance in the current international environment.
Iran also considers Turkey a key partner, because Turkey is one of the few Muslim
countries that can help the Islamic Republic break free of the isolation the West has
imposed on it.
Turkey and Syria
In the past, there was intense hostility and friction between Turkey and Syria. The
two countries came close to war on several occasions. 240 Historical tension between
Turkey and Syria were largely due to: territorial disputes, water problems, Cold War
rivalry, the PKK, as well as Turkey’s close relations with Israel. Syria had very strong
anti-Turkish feelings because Turkey, after the French mandate of Syria in 1983, took
over the Syrian province of Alexandretta and made it into the Turkish province of
Hatay. 241 In addition to the territorial conflict, the fact that the two countries were at
opposite poles of the Cold War further fueled tensions. While Turkey was a member of
NATO and a strong supporter of the Western alliance, Syria was aligned with the Soviet
Union. During this period military threats were very common on both sides. In order to
defend themselves, each side sought ways to pressure the other. 242 Turkey for example,
began constructing damn on the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, which significantly reduced
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water flows into the dry northern region of Syria. 243 Also, Syria worsened relations
between the two in the 1980s by allowing PKK militants to set up training facilities in
Lebanon’s Biqa’ valley.
In addition to providing state support for the PKK, Syria also let Abdullah
Öcalan, the PKK’s main leader, base himself in Damascus. As the scope of PKK terrorist
operations worsened in the 1990s, Turkey’s frustration with Damascus exacerbated. At
this time Turkey’s relations with Israel were excellent, especially in terms of military
cooperation. 244 Thus, in response to Damascus’ support for the PKK, the Turkish military
sought Israeli assistance in order increase the pressure on Syria. 245 Turkey’s alliance with
Israel, the ultimate enemy of the Arab world, dramatically increased anti-Turkish feelings
in Syria. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, Turkey was able to put more pressure on
Syria, without having to worry about greater Cold War confrontations. In 1998, Turkey
gave Syria an ultimatum: immediately cease support for the PKK or face a military
invasion. Syria chose the former option and soon expelled Öcalan, paving the way for his
capture in Kenya less than a year later. After ousting Öcalan, Turkey-Syrian relations
gradually improved as the two countries established diplomatic and economic
relations. 246 However, it was not until the AKP government came to power, that relations
between the two qualitatively improved.
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Under the AKP government Turkey’s relation with Damascus has undergone a
dramatic shift. Starting in 2004, a series of high-level visits took place between Turkey
and Syria. In 2004, Erdoğan traveled to Syria and signed economic and security
agreements. 247 Less than a year later in January 2005, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad
visited Ankara—this was the first time a Syrian President had traveled to Turkey. 248 In
addition to a transformed diplomatic relationship, Turkey and Syria improved their
economic relations as well. In 2004, Turkish-Syrian bilateral trade reached $752 million;
by 2008 total trade nearly tippled, reaching $2.06 billion. 249 Between 2005 and 2007,
more than 30 Turkish investment projects, valued at over $150 million, were launched in
Syria. Also, in 2006, Turkey and Syria established a free-trade zone and the two countries
set up a joint company for oil and natural gas exploration. There has also been a positive
change in civilian interactions. Between 2000 and 2005, Turkish tourists to Syria
increased nineteen-fold. 250 Moreover, in September 2009, Turkey and Syria agreed to lift
visa requirements, 251 which will further increase civilian interaction and boost tourism
among the two countries.
An important driving force behind this rapprochement between Syria and Turkey
was the Kurdish separatism issue in the post 9/11 environment. Syria which has a
Kurdish population of about one million, felt threatened by the Iraq War and the rise of
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Kurdish nationalism. Thus, this common security concern due to the U.S. invasion of Iraq
brought the two countries closer together. Also, Syria, like Iran, faces isolation from the
West, and seeks to use its ties with Turkey to expand its relations with the international
community. The AKP government aims to play an active role in the region, and is more
than willing to have Turkey be the bridge between Syria and the West. In fact, in 2007,
Turkey initiated and facilitated multiple rounds of indirect talks between Syria and Israel
with the aim of improving Israeli-Syrian relations. 252 Although the talks came to a halt
after the Israeli War on Gaza in 2009, Turkey’s engagement efforts did produce changes.
Serious talks were held on the Golan Heights and new borderlines. Also, Syria was able
to break out of its isolation. 253 As with Iran and Iraq, AKP leaders once again
demonstrated their commitment to diplomacy and proved their ability and desire to play
an active role in the region.
Turkey and the Arab World
For many Arabs, the election of a moderate Islamic party in Turkey was a positive
sign that shared Islamic and historical heritage could perhaps rekindle relations between
them. 254 The AKP’s Islamic character is certainly an important factor in fostering
cooperation between Ankara and the Arab world. Arab leaders naturally feel more
comfortable engaging with AKP leaders, who unlike the staunchly secular Kemalists are
pious and appreciative of their traditional ties with Muslim states. Furthermore, the fact
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that Turkey’s foreign policy under the AKP is no longer strictly aligned with that of its
Western allies, has gained Turkey popularity in the Arab world. Many Muslims
countries, particularly Arab states, now admire and praise Turkey for its refusal to allow
U.S. troops to use its bases for the invasion of Iraq and also for its condemnation of
Israeli actions.
Turkey’s active policy towards the Palestinian issue and Erdoğan’s criticism of
Israeli policy in the Occupied Territories, has won Ankara friends on the Arab street and
the broader Middle East. Unlike the Arab leaders who have become meek about Israel’s
treatment of Palestinians, Erdoğan has remained consistently outspoken and has called
out Israel on several occasions. Some believe that Turkey has now become the “new
protagonist of the Palestinians.” 255 In an interview with the International Crisis Group, an
Egyptian official mentions how Turkey used to be known as ‘atheist, anti-Islam, antiArab, the friend of Israel that abolished the caliphate.’ Now however, many in the Arab
world see a ‘new Turkey’ and are ‘fascinated not only by Erdoğan, but the phenomenon
of Turkey.’ A Syrian official also stated that ‘if Turkey didn’t exist, we would have to
invent it. There’s an Arab vacuum. Turkey is good for us because it draws attention to the
absolute lack of Arab initiatives.’ 256 By taking a harder stance on Israel and pursuing a
more independent policy in the region, Turkey has been able to enhance its prestige in the
Middle East.
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Turkey has increased its status as an important actor in the Middle East by not
only committing itself to the region politically, but also by asserting its power culturally
as well as economically. The AKP government has launched new programs and an
Arabic-language satellite channel throughout the Middle East, with the aim of
broadcasting positive views of Turkey. 257 Turkish soap operas and sitcoms dubbed in
Arabic have become extremely popular in the Middle East. Moreover, Turkish films and
music have spread throughout Middle Eastern markets. 258 Because of these efforts, many
people in the Arab world have become more familiar and more appreciative of Turkish
culture. According to the Turkish Ministry of Tourism and Culture, more than 300,000
tourists, mainly from the Middle East, have visited the house where the widely popular
Turkish soap opera Gümüş is shot. 259 By exporting its culture to the countries of the
Middle East, Turkey has been able to boost tourism, deepen its prestige, and strengthen
its popularity in the region. In line whit this soft power strategy, another way in which
Turkey has asserted its power has been through economic means.
A main part of the AKP’s strategy has been to strengthen Turkey’s economies
with the broader Middle East, which it has successfully achieved since coming to power
in 2002. In 2007, Turkey’s Foreign Trade Minister Kursad Tuzman announced that
Ankara’s plan to sign preferential trade agreements with eighteen Muslim countries,
including Pakistan and Iran. He also stated that Turkey would work towards reducing its
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tariff barriers in order to boost overall trade with the Economic Cooperation Organization
(ECO) which includes the six Central Asian countries, Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and
Turkey. 260 Furthermore, according to data obtained from the Turkish Statistical Institute,
the trade volume between Turkey and MENA (Middle East and North Africa) exceeded
$47 billion in 2008, a dramatic rise since 2002 when trade only amounted to
approximately $8 billion. Also in 2009, six Muslim countries consisting of Iraq, Iran,
Algeria, U.A.E., Saudi Arabia, and Egypt, made it on the list of Turkey’s top 15 trading
partners. 261 Trade volumes are expected to rise between Turkey and its Middle Eastern
partners, as Turkey just recently signed a deal with Syria, Lebanon and Jordan to
formally create a free trade zone and has similar plans in mind with the Gulf countries in
the region. 262 As the numbers demonstrate, trade ties with the broader Middle East have
received particular attention under the AKP government and have increased significantly
since 2002. Thus, it can be inferred that there is a strong capitalist economic force with
backing from the Turkish government that is driving Turkey’s foreign policy towards the
Middle East.
According to Roula Khalaf, Middle East editor of the Financial Times, “the one
consistent factor behind Ankara's revived interest in its neighborhood is economics.”
Khalaf believes that Turkey’s growing economic prosperity has given it the confidence to
expand and strengthen its global economic ties. Furthermore, given the fact that European
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economies are struggling, Turkey’s search for alternative markets should come as no
surprise. 263 Also, it is essential to highlight the important role Turkey’s Anatolian Tigers
and business leaders play in guiding Turkey’s foreign policy in the region.
The ambitious entrepreneurs of the Anatolian Tigers that have helped Turkey
become the 17th largest economy in the world are now encouraging AKP leaders to
pursue opportunities in the greater Middle East and Africa. 264 These conservative
business leaders serve as unofficial advisers and ambassadors and now have a greater say
in Turkish foreign policy. According to Janine Zacharai, a Middle East reporter for The
Washington Post, “when President Abdullah Gul visited Cameroon last month to sign a
free-trade accord and open a new embassy, he was accompanied by three cabinet
ministers, four members of parliamenzt -- and 147 businessmen.” 265 Turkey is looking
for new markets and new opportunities in areas where it has traditionally ignored in the
past, particularly the Middle East. Turkey has been able to strengthen its economy by
attracting billions of dollars in trade and investment from countries in the Middle East
and intends to continue this trend. In 2008, Turkey attracted a total of $4.3 billion in
investment from Middle Eastern and Gulf Arabian countries. After the EU, these
countries are now the second biggest investors in Turkey. 266
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No one can deny the fact that Turkey is increasingly expanding its economic
influence in the Middle East. However, despite the growing volumes of trade between
Turkey and Middle Eastern countries, these numbers are a small fraction of what Turkey
trades with the EU. The EU is by far Turkey’s biggest economic partner, both in terms of
trade and investment. In 2008, for example, Turkey’s overall trade with the European
Union was three times higher than its trade with MENA. Also, since the AKP
government came to power, trade with the European Union has been growing at a much
faster rate, compared to trade with MENA. 267 Thus, although Turkey’s growing
economic ties are worth recognizing, since it had been stagnant in the past, it is also
important to keep these numbers in perspective. Also, by comparing trade volumes, the
argument that Turkey is looking for an alternative to the European Union can be refuted.
Turkey is not trying to replace its economic ties with the EU but rather aiming to
complement it by improving its economic relations with the Middle East and Far East.
Moreover, Turkey has been pursuing trade relations with many other countries that do not
fit the EU and MENA categories, such as Russia and China. Russia and China are
currently among Turkey’s biggest trade partners. In 2009, nearly 10% of Turkey’s overall
trade was with Russia and approximately 6% was with China; the two were respectively
ranked as Turkey’s second and third trade partners. 268 Thus, it can be said that Turkey’s
economic drive has a global nature and that Turkey’s ultimate goal is to diversity its
economic ties.
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Conclusion
Turkey’s internal and external evolution in the past decade has been remarkable.
Turkey was once a rigidly secular, economically stagnant, and an undemocratic nation
ruled by the Kemalist elite, whom refused to accept civilian rule. Today Turkey is a
vibrant democratic country with a thriving economy and is governed by a moderate
Islamic government. It is currently the world’s 17th largest economy and it is expected to
grow faster than those of almost all European and Middle Eastern countries. The political
situation has also greatly improved. The mere fact that the AKP government has been
able to stay in power for nearly a decade without being overthrown and closed down by
the military is a clear sign of the positive changes taking place within Turkey. Erdoğan’s
AKP government has even been able to curtail the power of the military elite through its
sweeping democratic reforms. Years of political stability and economic growth under
AKP rule has boosted the nation’s self-confidence and allowed the government to focus
on diversifying Turkey’s external policies.
Since coming to power in 2002, the AKP government has launched a new foreign
policy agenda, one that is both dynamic and multi-faceted. Turkey has been
implementing a “zero-problem with neighbors” policy, one that focuses on its Middle
Eastern neighbors that had long been abandoned in the past. AKP leaders have reached
out to the Middle East in order to enhance Turkey’s economic and political clout and
establish the republic as an active player in the region. Under the AKP, Turkey is
behaving like a major regional power, relying on its past and present and solving
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historical disagreements with countries like Syria, Kurdish Iraq, and Iran. After spending
more than half a century denying its Ottoman past, Turkey is now embracing its Ottoman
legacy and great geographical and historical depth. AKP leaders are more comfortable
with Turkey’s Ottoman past. Unlike the Kemalist elite, they have held on to their
traditional and conservative values. They do not find it anyway contradicting for Turkey
to be engaging in the broader Middle East while remaining a U.S. ally and seeking EU
membership. In fact they believe that by rebuilding ties round the former Ottoman
Empire, they will strengthen Turkey’s power in regions where Western influence is weak,
and in turn make Turkey more attractive to the European Union and the United States.
The question on Ankara’s mind today is not whether Turkey should align itself
with the West or the East, but rather, what can Turkey do to become a global superpower.
For the AKP, part of the answer lies in Turkey’s ability to seize its strategic potential and
expand its influence in areas where it has traditionally ignored in the past. Through its
new pragmatic foreign policy and soft power strategy, AKP has succeeded in increasing
Turkey’s prestige in the Middle East. Turkey’s new involvement has been irksome to
some U.S. policy makers and observers and there have been recent tension between the
two countries. This should not however be surprising, given the new international
environment. In the post-Cold War era, Turkey and the United States no longer share an
existential threat. Thus, there is less need for Turkey to blindly emulate U.S. foreign
policy. Moreover, in the post-9/11 environment, Turkey found itself increasingly at odds
with U.S. policy in the region. The United State’s aggressive stance towards Iraq and Iran
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contradicted Ankara’s “zero-problem with neighbors” policy and its soft power approach.
Washington’s policies in addition to U.S. disregard for Turkish interests caused Ankara
to pursue its own independent path. An independent Turkish course of action does not
however mean a rejection of Western ties. Turkey’s influence in the West is what makes
it attractive to the East as well as vice versa. Turkey is not going to jeopardize its global
importance by turning away from the United States or the European Union. Turkey is
looking for various ways to enhance its power and EU membership would certainly
maximize its strategic clout. However, it is mainly up to the European Union to decide
whether they want to put their prejudices aside and unblock the negotiation chapters that
are keeping Turkey from gaining membership. Nonetheless, whether it joins the EU or
not, Turkey is going to continue the broadening and diversification of its foreign policy.
Turkey is poised to be an indispensible power. No other country lies at the
crossroads between Europe and Asia, with access to the Balkans, the Caucasus, the
Middle East and Europe. In addition to its geographical location, its sheer size and its
population of 70 million further enhance its importance. It currently has the second
largest population in the Middle East (Egypt’s population exceeds by 6 million), and is
expected to become the most populous nation in Europe within a few decades.
Furthermore, excluding Israel, Turkey is the strongest military power in the Middle East.
With nearly 515,000 troops, it is the second largest army of NATO (after the United
States). 269 Moreover, unlike its Middle Eastern neighbors, Turkey is not a major oil
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producer but it is an increasingly important oil transit country. It plays a key role in the
energy-pipeline business and is currently working on multiple projects such as Nabucco,
aimed at transporting oil and gas from various suppliers in Asia to consumers in
Europe. 270 To add to its uniqueness and global significance, Turkey is also a rare and
shining example in the Muslim world of a robust democracy with the rule of law and a
thriving free-market economy. In short, these characteristics coupled with Turkey’s
ability to balance its relations between East and West are bound to transform Turkey into
the next superpower.
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